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1. There are several types of contractual good faith, including good faith formation,
good faith performance, good faith breach, and good faith enforcement. See generally
STEVENJ. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACrUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT (1995). This article focuses on the treatment of the contrac-

tual covenant, or duty, of good faith performance. Both "covenant" and "duty" are often
used interchangeably to refer to this obligation to perform in good faith. See, e.g., Smitley v.
Cigna Corp., 640 F. Supp. 397, 402 (D. Kan. 1986) (discussing "the implied duty and covenant of good faith and fair dealing"); Dalrymple v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr.
2d 845, 853 (Ct. App. 1995) (referring to an insurer's "implied covenant duties of good
faith and fair dealing"); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 437
(Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (addressing the "the implied duty or covenant of good faith and fair
dealing"); Cooper v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 921 P.2d 1297, 1299
(Okla. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing "the implied covenant and duty to deal fairly and in
good faith"); Adolph Coors Co. v. Rodriguez, 780 S.W.2d 477, 482 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989)
(referring to "the implied covenant or duty of good faith"); THE FLORIDA BAR 2001 BusiNESS LITIGATION IN FLORIDA § 20.54 (2001) ("The duty of good faith, which originated in
the tort context, and the covenant of fair dealing, which originated in contract law, are
somewhat interchangeable, complementary concepts."); James Mabry Vickery, A Special Relationship: The Use of the Duty of Good Faith and FairDealing to Impose Tort Damages in Contracts
Between Lender and Borrower, 9 REV. LITIG. 93, 96 n.9 (1990) ("While some states distinguish
between the duty of good faith and fair dealing and the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, most states use these terms interchangeably."). But see Werner F. Ebke &James
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principle of contract interpretation to a significant doctrine with widespread applications. 2 Where the law's formalistic approach once limited contracting parties to the express terms of the contract, principles
akin to those found in equity now allow a degree of flexibility in contract interpretation that was previously shunned. 3
Unfortunately, discussions of good faith in general and the implied covenant of good faith performance in particular are often laced
with inconsistencies and failures to use sufficiently specific terms.
While "good faith" can mean many things and impose different obligations depending on the particular strain of good faith involved,
such subtle distinctions are often overlooked. The consequence of
these lapses and lack of attention to detail is considerable confusion as
to the nature of the covenant of good faith, when the covenant is implicated, and how claims arising from a breach of the covenant are
4
enforced.
This turmoil can be seen in Pennsylvania. There, these misunderstandings and missteps have created a body of case law that is both
internally inconsistent and often out of step with the case law of other
jurisdictions. 5 Imprecise language in court decisions, incorrect readings of the law, and decisions of other jurisdictions, especially California, have snowballed to such an extent that it is difficult to gauge how
the covenant of good faith is viewed.
Pennsylvania's experience is by no means exceptional. Nationally,
judicial decisions and commentators alike have repeatedly lamented
courts' misinterpretation and misapplication of contractual good faith
as leading to irreconcilable decisions. 6 Often, courts have handed
R. Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending Transactions:From Covenant to
Duty and Beyond, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1237, 1238 (1989) (distinguishing between the "covenant
of good faith" and the "duty of good faith" and noting that courts' tendency to use the
terms interchangeably has contributed to the confusion over the terms' meanings and implications). However, for the reasons set forth infra, the term "covenant" will be used wherever possible. See infra note 143.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 9-77.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 9-77.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 99-195.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 99-195.
6. See, e.g.,
Wapensky v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1119, 1130
(N.D. Ill.
1991) (noting that the defendant's proposed "leap of logic confuses the kind of
good faith that is required in every contract and the fiduciary duty that is found only in
certain circumstances"); Glenn v. Fleming, 799 P.2d 79, 90 (Kan. 1990) (discussing "the
confusion arising from our efforts to describe the duty of good faith and to identify the
situations involving bad faith/negligent duty to settle and to defend"); Hauer v. Union
State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (attributing confusion
of lower court, which called its own proceedings a "disaster," to "the parties' intermingling
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down broad pronouncements on the subject and subsequently reversed or scaled back their own decisions, or have seen their conclusions overturned by statute. 7 This has made the law on the subject in
numerous jurisdictions unstable, obscure, and perplexing in ways almost identical to Pennsylvania law.
This article begins by tracing the history of the implied covenant
of good faith and moves to an examination of two problems that have
of tort and contract principles"); Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., Good Faith in the Termination
and Formation ofFederal Contracts,56 MD.L. REv. 555, 569 (1997) ("The failure of the courts
and boards adjudicating government contracts disputes to recognize that the government
has a duty to exercise its termination discretion in good faith has caused confusion in the
case law."); Jason Randal Erb, Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in
Alaska: One Court's License to Override ContractualExpectations, 11 ALAsKA L. REv. 35 (1994)
(reviewing the Alaska Supreme Court's "inconsistent application" of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing); William E. Deitrick & Jeffrey C.B. Levine, Contractual Good
Faith:Let the Contract, Not the Courts, Define the Bargain,85 ILL. BJ. 120, 120 (1997) ("The law
governing the doctrine of the implied contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing is
confused, and court decisions are inconsistent."); Hon. Howard L. Fink, The Splintering of
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in Illinois Courts, 30 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 247
(1999) (discussing Illinois court's "underutilizing the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing"); Michael K. Martin & Daniel L. Cummings, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith:
Now You See It, Now You Don't, 9 ME. B.J. 306 (1994) (discussing contradictory good faith
decisions by Maine courts); Willy E. Rice, JudicialBias, the Insurance Industry and Consumer
Protection:An EmpiricalAnalysis of State Supreme Courts' Bad Faith, Breach-of-Contract,Breach-of
Covenant-of-Good-Faithand Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 325,
335 (1992) (discussing "confusion" stemming from "state supreme courts' use of imprecise
language when deciding bad-faith causes of action"). This confusion extends even beyond
the borders of the United States. SeeJan Woloniecki, The Duty of Utmost Good Faith in Insurance Law: Where is it in the 21st Century?, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 63 (2002) (reviewing questions of
insurance good faith under English law); Hon. Ulrich Magnus, Remarks on Good Faith: The
United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial Contracts, 10
PACE INT'L L. Rxv. 89 (1998) (discussing principles of contractual good faith under the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods); Arthur
Hartkamp, The Concept of Good Faith in the UNIDROIT Principlesfor InternationalCommercial
Contracts, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65 (1994) (discussing international dimensions of
contractual good faith debate); Paul J. Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and
United Nations Convention on the Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 18 J.L. & COM.
333, 353 (1999) (concluding that "[c]ourts are confused as to whether a good faith obligation exists and are rendering inconsistent decisions" under the Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods).
7. See, e.g., Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1995)
(overruling Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal.
1958)); Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1991) (overruling Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1985)); Story v. City of
Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775-76 (Mont. 1990) (revising definition of good faith set forth in
Nicholson v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342, 1348 (Mont. 1985)); Howard v. Dorr
Woolen Co., 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980) (limiting application of Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974)); Scherer Constr., LLC v. Hedquist Constr., Inc., 18 P.3d
645 (Wyo. 2001) (abrogating Loghry v. Unicover Corp., 927 P.2d 706 (Wyo. 1996)).
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arisen nationally in confronting the covenant: whether the covenant is
implicated in every contractual relationship or only some contractual
relationships, and whether a breach of the covenant of good faith
gives rise to an independent cause of action or is merely a tool of
contract interpretation. Although the focus of this article is on Pennsylvania law and the involvement of Pennsylvania courts with these issues, the topics discussed are sufficiently general and the problems
confronted in Pennsylvania are sufficiently common that this article
should be of assistance to courts, scholars, and practitioners in other
jurisdictions.8 Perhaps more importantly, this article draws attention
to the hidden pitfalls that threaten a person engaging in any discussion on the implied covenant of good faith, and will help any such
speaker to choose her words more carefully.
I.

Origins and History of the Implied Covenant of
Good Faith

A.

Early Modem Developments

Although the concept of contractual good faith has origins
stretching back to ancient times through eighteenth century England,9 the current form of the doctrine did not emerge until the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Many early modern cases
center on output and requirements contracts and address terms that
are left to a contracting party's discretion, including one party's satisfaction with another party's performance. 10 Eventually, decisions es8. Similarly, articles addressing the implied covenant of good faith as applied in
other jurisdictions may be of use to an out-of-state practitioner or scholar. See, e.g., Theresa
Viani Agee, Breach of an Insurer'sGood Faith Duty to Its Insured: Tort or Contract?, 1988 UTAH L.
REv. 135; Erb, supra note 6, at 35; Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good
Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235 (1994); John Reid Montgomery, Bid Imperfections in
CaliforniaPublic Contracting:Carving Out a Good Faith Exception to the Void Contract Rule, 38
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 205 (1997); James A. Webster, A Pound of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme
Court Virtually Eliminates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith,75 OR. L. REV.
493, 497-509 (1996).
9. See Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrineof Good Faith Purchase,63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1057-58 (1954); Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A Comment on Bad
Faith's UnnaturalHistory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1319-26 (1994); Nicola W. Palmieri, Good
Faith DisclosuresRequired during PrecontractualNegotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 80-82
(1993); Webster, supra note 8, at 497-509.
10. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 1, § 2.2.1.2; John C. Weistart, Requirements and
Output Contracts: Quantity Variations Under the UCC, 599 DUKE L.J. 1973; see also, e.g.,
Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 F. 298, 302-03 (6th Cir. 1903)
(finding that fluctuations in purchases under option contract were permissible "if the result of the carrying on of the business with good faith in view of the obligations of the
plaintiff to the defendant"); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Brydon, 3 A. 306, 309 (Md.
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pousing the implied covenant of good faith reached a critical mass in
New York. By 1903, the doctrine had enough support that the New
York Court of Appeals could state the following with regard to a plaintiff's purchase obligations under a requirements contract:
[W]e do not mean to assert that the plaintiff had the right, under
the contract, to order goods to any amount. Both parties in such a
contract are bound to carry it out in a reasonable way. The obligation of good faith and fair dealing towards each other is implied in
every contract of this character. The plaintiff could not use the
contract for the purpose of speculation in a rising market, since
that would be a plain abuse of the rights conferred, and something
like a fraud upon the seller.11

Two watershed New York Court of Appeals cases are regarded as
the source of the modern United States incarnation of the doctrine of
contractual good faith and provide a decisive break with prior formalist thinking.' 2 The first of these, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon,l 3 is a
1886) (holding that contract's satisfaction clause did not give right to exercise "capricious
or arbitrary discretion" in rejecting delivery); Doll v. Noble, 22 N.E. 406 (N.Y. 1889) (stating that if the work was performed by the plaintiffs in accordance with the other provisions
of the contract, in the best workmanlike manner, the defendant could not refuse to pay
them by unreasonably, or in bad faith, saying the work was not done to his satisfaction).
11. New York Cent. Ironworks Co. v. United States Radiator Co., 66 N.E. 967, 968
(N.Y. 1903). See also Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 118 N.E. 618, 619 (N.Y.
1918) ("Every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it.").
No one can be made by contract the final judge of his own acts, for the law writes
'good faith' into such agreements. No covenant of immunity can be drawn that
will protect a person who acts in bad faith, because such a stipulation is against
public policy, and the courts will not enforce it.
Indus. & Gen. Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9 (N.Y. 1905); see also Genet v. President of Del. &
Hudson Canal Co., 32 N.E. 1078, 1082 (N.Y. 1893) ("Good faith, honest dealing, business
candor and fairness require that this contract should be enforced in the sense and with the
meaning which was in the mind of both parties at the time of its execution.").
12. Each of these cases has been cited numerous times. For citations to Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917), see, for example, Flight Concepts Ltd. P'ship
v. Boeing Co., 819 F. Supp. 1535, 1552 (D. Kan. 1993); Not About Water Comm. v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 526, 534 (Ct. App. 2002); Raisler Sprinkler Co. v. Automatic
Sprinkler Co. of Am., 171 A. 214, 220 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934); Bonner v. Westbound
Records, Inc., 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1309 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Kladivo v. Melberg, 227 N.W.
833, 837 (Iowa 1929); Stop & Shop, Inc. v. Ganem, 200 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Mass. 1964); Nat'l
Ref. Co. v. Cox, 57 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Mo. Ct. App. 1933); Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp.,
738 N.Y.S. 2d 658, 662 (N.Y. 2001); Pac. Pines Constr. Corp. v. Young, 477 P.2d 894, 895
(Or. 1970); Maxwell v. Schaefer, 112 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. 1955). For citations to KirkeLa Shelle
Co. v. PaulArmstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933), see, for example, Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. S. Diamond Assoc., Inc., 911 F.2d 1548, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); Lorenz v.
CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1415 (3d Cir. 1993); Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Balt. & Ohio R.
Co., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir. 1982); Quader-Kino A.G. v. Nebenzal, 217 P.2d 650, 655
(Cal. 1950); Eline Realty Co. v. Foeman, 252 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Ky. 1952); Centronics Corp. v.
Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 191 (N.H. 1989); infra note 23.
13. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
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staple of many first-year law school contracts classes. In Wood, the defendant had given the plaintiff the exclusive right to market her line
of clothing in exchange for half of all profits. 14 When the defendant
began using other distributors, the plaintiff brought suit against her
for breach of contract. In response, the defendant argued that her
agreement with the plaintiff had imposed no obligations on him and
was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial
of the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In doing
so, the court specifically rejected the defendant's argument that her
agreement with the plaintiff did not constitute a contract:
[The defendant] says that the plaintiff does not bind himself to
anything. It is true that he does not promise in so many words that

he will use reasonable efforts to place the defendant's indorsements and market her designs. We think, however, that such a
promise is fairly to be implied. The law has outgrown its primitive
stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be "instinct with
an obligation," imperfectly expressed. If that is so, there is a contract. The implication of a promise here finds support in many circumstances. The defendant gave an exclusive privilege. She was to
have no right for at least a year to place her own indorsements or
market her own designs except through the agency of the plaintiff.
The acceptance of the exclusive agency was an assumption of its
duties. We are not to1 5suppose that one party was to be placed at the
mercy of the other.
Over a decade later, the Court of Appeals revisited the obliga-

tions arising from the covenant of good faith in Kirke La Shelle Co. v.
Paul Armstrong Co.' 6 There, the parties had entered into a contract
giving the plaintiff a one-half financial interest in and a right to approve "all contracts, sales, licenses, or other arrangements to be made
in the future affecting the title to the dramatic rights (exclusive of
motion picture rights)" of certain plays. 17 At the time the contract was
entered into, talking motion pictures, known as "talkies," had not yet
been invented. 18 When the defendant sold "talkie" movie rights to a
producer several years later, the plaintiff brought suit for one-half of
the profits. ' 9
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 214.
Id. at 214. (citations omitted).
188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).
Id. at 165.
See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 1 § 2.2.2.2.
188 N.E. at 164.
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The Kirk La Shelle Co. court held that "talkies" were not contemplated by the parties at the time the contract was entered into and
were therefore not encompassed by the definition of contracts requiring plaintiff approval or the exception of motion picture rights that
the defendant was free to pursue independently. 20 Nevertheless, the
court held that the contract implied that the plaintiff generally was
entitled to a portion of profits generated by the use of the show's dramatic rights. By failing to secure the plaintiffs approval and share
talkie profits, the defendant breached its good faith obligations, which
the court articulated as follows:
In every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract,
exists an implied covewhich means that in every contract2 there
1
nant of good faith and fair dealing.
The ongoing legitimacy of Kirke La Shelle Co.'s good faith holding
is open to debate. In the first place, the primary basis for the court's
ruling was a fiduciary duty argument, making the good faith discussion little more than dictum. In addition, later holdings restricted the
potential application of the case's practical effect. 22 In spite of these
failings, the fact that numerous courts have embraced this decision
and have relied on its definition and discussion of the implied covenant of good faith when applying New York law or otherwise testifies
23
to its continuing worth.
B.

Mainstream Acceptance of Good Faith

The implied covenant of good faith began to achieve wider acceptance when the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") was promulgated in 1951.24 Section 1-203 of the UCC states, simply, that "[e]very
contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in
20. See id. at 166.
21. Id. at 167.
22. See, e.g., Abkco Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (limiting Kirke La Shelle Co. and criticizing decision that found videocassettes not to be "motion pictures"); Hellman v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 309 N.Y.S.2d 180,
180-81 (N.Y. 1970) (distinguishing Kirke La Shelle Co.); see also Steven J. Burton, Good Faith
Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. Rv. 1,

29-30 (1981).
Uproar Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 81 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir. 1936); Broad v.
23. See, e.g.,
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 430 (5th Cir. 1980); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer
Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Shaw v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 226 A.2d 903, 906 (Vt. 1966).
24. The delay between the earlier cases and the widespread acceptance of the implied
covenant of good faith has been attributed not to a change in legal sentiment, but to
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its performance or enforcement. '25 This "obligation of good faith" is
defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 26 The breadth of this obligation is remarkable:
This section sets forth a basic principle running throughout this

Act. The principle involved is that in commercial transactions good
faith is required in the performance and enforcement of all agreements or duties. Particular applications of this general principle
appear in specific provisions of the Act such as the option to accelerate at will (Section 1-208), the right to cure a defective delivery of
goods (Section 2-508), the duty of a merchant buyer who has rejected goods to effect salvage operations (Section 2-603), substituted performance (Section 2-614), and failure of presupposed
conditions (Section 2- 615). The concept, however, is broader than
any of these illustrations and applies generally, as stated in this section, to the performance or enforcement of every contract or duty
within this Act. It is further implemented
by Section 1-205 on
27
course of dealing and usage of trade.
Nevertheless, those drafting the UCC and incorporating the obligation to act in good faith did not believe themselves to be doing anything more than setting forth the current state of United States
mercantile law and obligations existing at common law.28
Around this time, commentators initiated an academic discussion
on the implied covenant of good faith and how good faith could be
defined. In 1963, E. Allan Farnsworth set forth his definition of good
faith as requiring "cooperation on the part of one party to the contract so that another party will not be deprived of his reasonable exchanges in West Publishing Company's methods of organizing cases. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 1, § 2.2.2.2.
25. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001).
26. Id. § 1-201 (2001).
27. Id. § 1-203, cmt. (2001). The obligation of good faith was subsequently broadened
for specific articles of the UCC. See Denise R. Boklach, Comment, Commercial Transactions:
U.C.C. Section 1-201(19) Good Faith-Is Now the Time to Abandon the Pure Heart/Empty Head
Test?, 45 OKLA. L. REv. 647, 666-67 (1992) (discussing modifications to UCC articles 3, 4,
and 4A).
28. See Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: The
Practice View, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 1533 (1994); see also Robert Braucher, The Legislative
History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 812-14 (1958) (discussing
UCC good faith and individual states' reactions); Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith under the
Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. RFv. 1 (1971) (discussing UCC approach to good faith) [hereinafter Eisenberg];John Honnold, Buyer's Right of
Rejection:A Study in the Impact of Codificationupon a CommercialProblem, 97 U. PA. L. Rv. 457,
475-76 (1949) (discussing good faith as applied to rejection of goods); Eugene F. Mooney,
Old Kontract Principlesand Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudenceof Our New Commercial
Law, 11 VILL. L. REv. 213, 244-53 (1966) (discussing origins of commercial good faith
under the UCC); Weistart, supra note 10, at 599 (linking common law decisions to UCC
provisions). As noted below, Pennsylvania adopted the UCC in 1980. See infra note 91.
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pectations." 29 Five years later, Robert S. Summers offered what
became known as "excluder analysis" to hone the definition of good
faith:
In contract law, taken as a whole, good faith is an "excluder." It is a
phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its own and
serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad
faith. In a particular context the phrase takes on a specific meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific form
30
of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.

Scholars expanded on this analysis and offered rationales for the
doctrine, 3 1 and a substantial and diverse body of academic work on
the implied covenant of good faith, both in favor and against, quickly
32
developed.
Segments of this discussion were a primary influence on the 1973
adoption of Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
29. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 669 (1963). Farnsworth noted that one of
the key times the doctrine of good faith was invoked was in connection with the revaluation of debts in post-World War I Germany, where hyperinflation reduced the value of the
German mark to one billionth of its former value. See id. at 678-79.
30. Robert S. Summers, Good Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968) (footnotes omitted). Summers
went on to cite the following as examples of bad faith: "evasion of the spirit of the deal,
lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of only substantial performance, abuse
of a power to specify terms, abuse of a power to determine compliance, and interference
with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance." Id. at 232-33.
31. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV.L. REv. 369, 391-94 (1980) (discussing reasons that justify good faith
performance doctrine); Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1 (discussing different definitions of
UCC good faith and stressing the importance of the concept); Robert S. Summers, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 810, 826-28 (1982) (discussing rationales for implying covenant of good
faith in contracts). For two more recent defenses of contractual good faith, see Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, Good Faith: A New Look at an Old Doctrine, 28 AKRON L. REv. 31
(1994); Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy and Good Faith, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1223 (1999).
32. See, e.g., StevenJ. Burton, Reply, More on Good Faith Performanceof a Contract: A Reply
to Professor Summers, 69 IowA L. REv. 497 (1984); Burton, supra note 22, at 1; Thomas A.
Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standardsfor Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith
and FairDealingHas Been Violated: A Frameworkfor Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 585,
587 (1996); Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 1; Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of
Good Faith, 619 DUKE L.J. 1981; Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing to Excessively Priced Consumer
Credit Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REv. 940 (1986); Calvin R. House, Good Faith Rejection and
Specific Performancein PublishingContracts: Safeguardingthe Author's Reasonable Expectations, 51
BROOK. L. REv. 95 (1984); see also Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo,
Bargainingin Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A ComparativeStudy, 77 HARv. L. REV. 401
(1964) (comparing common law and German approaches to contractual good faith).
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("Restatement"), 33 which was subsequently adopted by a sizeable number of jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. 34 As with the UCC, the
Restatement provision was succinct, stating that "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement." 35 The Restatement went on to tie in

the UCC definition of good faith and to elaborate:
Good faith is defined in Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(19) as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." "In the
case of a merchant" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-103(1)(b) provides that good faith means "honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." The
phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning
varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the
other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized
as involving "bad faith" because they violate community standards
of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for
a breach of 36the duty of good faith also varies with the
circumstances.
Given the similarities between the two provisions, it is perhaps
not surprising that courts applying the UCC, Restatement, and common law principles of good faith often fail to differentiate between
the good faith obligations imposed under each or rely on one to flesh
7
out the other
By 1980, a majority of United States jurisdictions recognized "the
duty to perform a contract in good faith as a general principle of con33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979); see also Summers, supra note
31, at 810-25 (discussing drafting of Section 205 of the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
CONTRACTS).

34. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 217 (1985); Hooters of Am.,
Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1290 (S.D. Ohio 1996); Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 660 F. Supp.
1388, 1391, 1392 (D. Colo. 1987); Shipkowski v. United States Steel Corp., 585 F. Supp. 66,
68 (E.D. Pa. 1983); ABA Distrib., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 542 F. Supp. 1272, 1285, 1286
(W.D. Mo. 1982); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Alaska 1983); Kooyman v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 34 (Iowa 1982).

35.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 205 (1979).

36. Id. at cmt. a.
37. See, e.g., Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc. v.JGR, Inc., 3 Fed. Appx. 467, 471-72
(6th Cir. 2001); California v. Chevron Corp., 872 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th Cir. 1989); Coast
Cities Truck Sales, Inc. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 912 F. Supp. 747, 776 (D.N.J. 1995);
Ripplemeyer v. Nat'l Grape Coop. Ass'n, 807 F. Supp. 1439, 1451-52 (W.D. Ark. 1992);
Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). But see Boklach, supra note
27, at 674-75 (discussing differences between Restatement and UCC usages of "good
faith").
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tract law."3 8 Nevertheless, discussions aimed at finding a precise definition for good faith continue and can be summarized as follows:
[L]egal commentators have differed with regard to the manner in
which good faith and fair dealing should be defined. Accordingly,
the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing has been defined variously as requiring reasonableness or fair conduct, reasonable standards of fair dealing, decency as well as fairness and
reasonableness, fairness, and community standards of fairness, decency and reasonableness....
As a majority of commentators seem to recognize, however, it is
probably better that the definition of good faith and fair dealing
remains amorphous so that the doctrine can be applied on a caseby-case basis. Nonetheless, some commentators have criticized expansive definitions of good faith and fair dealing as being too
vague. Although the concept of good faith and fair dealing will
require additional exposition when applied to negotiations, such
imprecision
in its definition is not unworkable and is common in
39
the law.

38. Burton, supra note 31, at 369 (citing the following cases as explicitly recognizing
this covenant: Commerce Int'l Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 81, 85 (Ct. Cl. 1964); World's
Exposition Shows v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, No. 148, 186 So. 721, 723 (Ala.
1939); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979); Beaugureau v. Beaugureau, 463
P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970); Nelson v. Abraham, 177 P.2d 931, 934 (Cal. 1947);
Blish v. Thompson Automatic Arms Corp., 64 A.2d 581, 597 (Del. 1948); Crooks v. Chapman Co., 185 S.E.2d 787, 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank,
154 N.E.2d 683, 690-91 (Ill. 1958); Midwest Mgmt. Corp. v. Stephens, 291 N.W.2d 896, 913
(Iowa 1980); Odem Realty Co. v. Dyer, 45 S.W.2d 838, 840 (Ky. 1932); Food Fair Stores,
Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (Md. 1964); Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 278 N.E.2d
387, 393 (Mass. 1972); Burkhardt v. City Nat'l Bank, 226 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975); Faust & Forden, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 421 S.W.2d 809, 813 (Mo. 1967); U.V. Indus.,
Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571, 581 (Mont. 1979); Griswold v. Heat, Inc., 229 A.2d 183,
187 (N.H. 1967); Palisades Prop., Inc. v. Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965); Kirke La
Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 253 S.E.2d 625, 627-28 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Miles v. NJ. Motors, Inc., 338 N.E.2d 784, 787-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); W. Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Serv.
Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Okla. 1972); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 383tP.2d 107, 112
(Or. 1963) (en banc); Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 297 A.2d 643, 645 (R.I. 1972);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 147 S.E.2d 481, 484 (S.C. 1966); Zion's
Prop., Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Heins, 205 A.2d
561, 566 (Vt. 1964); Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 410 P.2d 33, 34 (Wash. 1966); Chayka v.
Santini (In re Estate of Chayka), 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1970)).
39. Palmieri, supra note 9, at 79-80 (footnote omitted); see also Uberti v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 90, 103-04 (D. Conn. 2001) ("Determination of what constitutes bad faith must be determined on a case-by-case basis."); Wade v. Kessler Inst., 778
A.2d 580, 584-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (reviewing competing definitions to
evaluate jury charge on covenant of good faith); Paula J. Dalley, The Law of PartnerExpulsions: FiduciaryDuty and Good Faith,21 CARDOZO L. REV. 181 ("Contrary to the assertions of
some commentators, good faith is not a nebulous, meaningless concept.").
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Regardless of any ambiguities as to its definition, the concept of
the implied covenant of good faith has become firmly entrenched in
principles of United States contract law.
C.

Expansion Toward Tort: Bad Faith

Even as the implied covenant of good faith gained wider acceptance, a line of cases emerged, first in California and then elsewhere,
in which courts recognized a separate cause of action, usually based at
least in part in tort, arising from a party's failure to adhere to its implied covenant of good faith. For the purposes of this article and for
the sake of simplicity, this cause of action will be referred to as "bad
faith." Although the expansion of bad faith claims has halted and
been reversed, the claim itself marks a significant development that
often colors how the term "good faith" is heard and used.
The benchmark case in which the California Supreme Court held
that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith could give rise to a
tort action is Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co. 40 In
Comunale, the plaintiff had been seriously injured when he was struck
by a vehicle driven by Percy Sloan. 41 At the time, Sloan was insured by
the defendant under a policy that had a limit of $10,000 per injured
person and $20,000 per accident and that gave the defendant the
right to approve any settlement. 42 Although the plaintiff made an offer to settle the claim well within the policy limits, Sloan did not have
the financial wherewithal to do so, and the defendant refused to defend Sloan or to provide the funds necessary for settlement. 43 At trial,
the jury returned a verdict of $25,000 for the plaintiff.4 4 Sloan subse-

quently assigned his rights against the defendant to the plaintiff, who
brought suit to recover the amount of the verdict in excess of the
policy. 45 On appeal, the California Supreme Court examined whether
Sloan, and thus the plaintiff, had a sustainable cause of action against

40.
41.

328 P.2d 198 (1958).
See id. at 200.

42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. The jury also returned a verdict of $1,250 for the plaintiff's wife, who was
also injured in the accident.
45. See id. In a separate action, the plaintiff had recovered $10,000 from the defendant. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 253 P.2d 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
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the defendant for the amount of the original judgment in excess of
the policy limit of $10,000.46
The Comunale court first noted that "[t] here is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party
will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement. '47 The court further held that "the implied
obligation of good faith and fair dealing requires the insurer to settle
in an appropriate case although the express terms of the policy do not
impose such a duty."48 An insurer could act in breach of this obligation when determining whether or not to accept an offer of
settlement:
We do not agree with the cases that hold there is no liability in
excess of the policy limits where the insurer, believing there is no
coverage, wrongfully refuses to defend and without justification refuses to settle the claim. An insurer who denies coverage does so at
its own risk, and, although its position may not have been entirely
groundless, if the denial is found to be wrongful it is liable for the
full amount which will compensate the insured for all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of the express and implied
obligations of the contract.
Certainly an insurer who not only rejected a reasonable offer of
settlement but also wrongfully refused to defend should be in no
better position than if it had assumed the defense and then declined to settle. The insurer should not be permitted to profit by its
own wrong. A breach which prevents the making of an advantageous settlement when there is a great risk of liability in excess of
the policy limits will, in the ordinary course of things, result in a
judgment against the insured in excess of those limits....
• . .The question is what would Sloan have gained from the full

performance of the policy contract with Traders. If Traders had
performed its contract, it would have settled the action against
Sloan, thereby protecting him from all liability. The allowance of a
recovery in excess of the policy limits will not give the insured any
additional advantage but merely place him in the same position as
if the contract had been performed.
It follows from what we have said that an insurer, who wrongfully
declines to defend and who refuses to accept a reasonable settlement within the policy limits in violation of its duty to consider in
good faith the interest of the insured in the settlement, is liable for
46. 328 P.2d at 200. The court also considered whether Sloan's cause of action against
the defendant was assignable and whether the cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations.
47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 201.
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the entire judgment against the insured even if it exceeds the policy limits.

49

The court further hinted that the action arising from an insurer's
failure to settle arose part in contract and part in tort,50 although the
decision focused primarily on the contract aspects of the plaintiffs
51
claim.
By its own terms, Comunale extended this tort-contract hybrid
claim only to situations where an insurer failed to settle a claim within
the limits of the relevant policy:
The decisive factor in fixing the extent of Traders' liability is not
the refusal to defend; it is the refusal to accept an offer of settlement within the policy limits. Where there is no opportunity to
compromise the claim and the only wrongful act of the insurer is
the refusal to defend, the liability of the insurer is ordinarily limited to the amount of the policy plus attorneys' fees and costs. In
such a case it is reasoned that, if the insured has employed competent counsel to represent him, there is no ground for concluding
that the judgment would have been for a lesser sum had the defense been conducted by insurer's counsel, and therefore it cannot
be said that the detriment suffered by the insured as the result of a
judgment in excess of the policy limits was proximately caused by
the insurer's refusal to defend. This reasoning, however, does not
apply where the insurer wrongfully52refuses to accept a reasonable
settlement within the policy limits.

However, California cases immediately following Comunale expanded on the doctrine in both scope and concomitant rights. In
Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.,5 3 the California Supreme Court confirmed that a suit for an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of
49. Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
50. Commentators have coined the term "contort" to describe the nature of this new
cause of action. See Tad Armstrong, Breach of Contract and Punitive Damages: Mr. Corbin, Say
It Isn't So, 85 ILL. B.J. 74, 75 (1997) (discussing a legal bestiary that includes the "the 'threelegged contort,' which seems to support punitive damages on the theory of 'unreasonable
deprivation of contractual rights,"' the "'two-toed tortcon,' which holds that 'the breach of
a contract itself may constitute an 'unusual case where an independent willful tort will be
found,"' and the "contractfeasor"); MatthewJ. Barrett, Note, "Contort"."Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealingin Noninsurance,Commercial Contracts-ItsExistence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 510 (1985); Michael Dorff, Attaching Tort
Claims to ContractActions: An Economic Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 390 (1997)
(proposing a framework for attaching a tort claim to a breach of contract action and applying framework to contorts); Michael Sean Quinn, The Defending Liability Insurer's Duty to
Settle: A Meditation upon Some First Principles,35 TORT & INs. L.J. 929, 951-52 (2000) (discussing possibility of treating bad faith claims as a "contort"); G. Richard Shell, Substituting
Ethical Standardsfor Common Law Rules in Commercial Cases: An Emerging Statutoy Trend, 82
Nw. U. L. REV. 1198, 1209-10 (1988) (discussing interaction of common law and contort).
51. See 328 P.2d at 203.
52. Id. at 201 (citation omitted).
53. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
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good faith sounded in tort as well as contract, entitling the plaintiff to
compensation for mental distress, a remedy not permitted in contract
claims. 54 Six years later, the same court held that a bad faith claim was
55
available to first-party insurers proceeding against an excess carrier,
and the following year found that punitive damages were available
56
under this new contract-tort.
At the same time, courts in jurisdictions across the United States
adopted the reasoning of Comunale and began permitting claims and
extra-contractual damages for an insurer's breach of the covenant of
good faith. 57 While courts often differed as to whether a bad faith
61
60
59
58
claim sounded in tort, contract or both, many, though not all,

54.

See id. at 178-79.

See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Cal. 1974).
57. See, e.g., Chavers v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So.2d 1 (Ala. 1981); State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Alaska 1989); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726
P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975); cf Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp,
349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976) (refusing to adopt a separate tort action for bad faith, but
allowing punitive damages "[w]henever the elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or
oppression mingle in the controversy").
58. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Ark.
1984); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985); Buckman v. People
Express, Inc., 530 A.2d 596, 599 (Conn. 1987); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d
1014, 1018 (Idaho 1986); Curry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 784 S.W.2d 176, 177-78 (Ky.
1989); Weems v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 486 So. 2d 1222, 1226 (Miss. 1986); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Montoya, 566 P.2d 105, 106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1977); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638, 645 (N.D. 1979); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452
N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ohio 1983); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980);
Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); Anderson v. Cont'l
Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
59. See, e.g., Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 264 (Del. 1995);
We Sell Used Cars, Inc. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 715 So. 2d 656 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Pickett
v. Lloyds, 621 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993); Fleming v. Allstate Ins. Co., 482 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y.
App. Div.1984); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985); cf William S.
Dodge, The Casefor Punitive Damages in Contracts,48 DuKE L.J. 629 (1999) (arguing in favor
of allowing punitive damages in breach of contract cases, including bad faith claims).
55.
56.

60. Dailey v. Integon Gen. Ins. Co., 331 S.E.2d 148, 153 (N.C. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Washington v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1991);
Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644 (Me. 1993); Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Mich. 1980); Rossmann v. G.F.C. Corp. of Mo., 596 S.W.2d
469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat'l. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966 (Pa.
1981). Some of these states and others have adopted statutes to allow an insured to proceed against an insurer on bad faith or similar grounds for some form of compensation.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 31-2410 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. § 627.428 (2002); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/155 (2002); Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.420 (2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2002);
1976 S.C. CODE ANN. REcs. 38-59-40 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (2002).
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found the logic in favor of the right to a bad faith claim against an
insurer in some capacity sufficiently convincing.
However, California courts did not stop with insurance claims. In
1980, the California Court of Appeal held that a breach of the covenant of good faith inherent in an employment contract gave rise to a
contract-tort bad faith claim. 62 Soon after, the California Supreme
Court issued a decision in Seaman's Direct Buying Service Inc. v. Standard
Oil Co. 63 that indicated a willingness to go even further:
While the proposition that the law implies a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in all contracts is well established, the proposition
advanced by Seaman's-that breach of the covenant always gives
rise to an action in tort-is not so clear. In holding that a tort action is available for breach of the covenant in an insurance contract, we have emphasized the "special relationship" between
insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public interest,
adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility. No doubt there are other
relationships with similar characteristics and deserving of similar
64
legal treatment.
The concept of the "special relationship" was explained further
in Wallis v. Superior Court,65 where the court found that the "special
relationship" between the plaintiff and his former employer allowed
him to proceed on his bad faith claim for breach of the covenant implied in his employment contract:
For purposes of serving as a predicate to tort liability, we find that
the following "similar characteristics" must be present in a contract: (1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal bargaining positions; (2) the motivation for entering
the contract must be a non-profit motivation, i.e., to secure peace
of mind, security, future protection; (3) ordinary contract damages
are not adequate because (a) they do not require the party in the
superior position to account for its actions, and (b) they do not
make the inferior party "whole;" (4) one party is especially vulnera62. See Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 468 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980). Around this
time, it was argued that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in an employment contract could be used as a cudgel against an employee as well. SeeJeffrey M. Judd,
Note, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Examining Employees' Good Faith
Duties, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 483 (1988); cf Stephens v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 852 P.2d 565,
568 (Mont. 1993) (If "the insured breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the
result is not a tort, but a breach of contract,"). For a detailed examination of contractual
good faith in employment relationships, see Monique C. Lillard, FilyJurisdictionsin Search of
a Standard: The Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo. L.
REv. 1233 (1992).
63. 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1958).
64. Id. at 1166 (citation omitted).
65. See 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1984). It is this "special relationship" requirement
that some Pennsylvania courts have fixed on and misapplied; see infra text accompanying
notes 99-160.
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ble because of the type of harm it may suffer and of necessity
places trust in the other party to perform; and (5) the other party
is aware of this vulnerability.
These criteria having been met, the party in the stronger position
has a heightened duty not to act unreasonably in breaching the
the interest of the other party as tantacontract, and to consider
66
mount to its own.
While California courts and a handful of others embraced an independent contract-tort claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith beyond an insurance context, 6 7 most other jurisdictions steadfastly refused to create a new cause of action separate from a contract
claim outside of an insurance context.68 Even in California, Seaman's
sowed the seeds of confusion and led to numerous conflicting decisions.6i9 Seaman's also faced harsh criticism from scholars who felt that
the decision "represent[ed] a potentially disastrous expansion of the
bad faith tort into the commercial realm."7 °
66. Id. at 129 (citation omitted).
67. See, e.g., Dare v. Mont. Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Mont. 1984)
(holding that tort liability may be imposed for breach of an employment contract's implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev.
1987) (finding that tort damages were available for breach of the covenant of good faith in
an employment context); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,
221 (Wyo. 1994) ("[R]ecovery of damages is permitted for tortious conduct which arises
out of a contractual relationship of employment in breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing."). It has been stated that some decisions embrace tort liability for a
breach of good faith obligations even outside of the expanded "special relationship" context. See Susan D. Gresham, "Bad Faith Breach ": A New and Growing Concern for Financial
Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 891, 904-13 (1989) (reviewing cases applying tort duty of
good faith to contracts without a finding of a special relationship). In particular, it has
been stated that Montana courts took positions even more extreme than those embraced
by their California counterparts. See Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract
Rises from the Ashes of the Bad Faith Tort, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 483, 497 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Kennedy Elec. Co., v. Moore-Handley, Inc., 437 So. 2d 76, 81 (Ala. 1983)
("We are not prepared to extend the tort of bad faith beyond the area of insurance policy
cases at this time."); Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765 P.2d 531 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (refusing to extend tort of bad faith to real estate contract); Aluevich v. Harrah's,
660 P.2d 986, 987 (Nev. 1983) (refusing to extend tort of bad faith to commercial leasing
contract); Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 (Okla. 1988) (refusing to extend tort of bad faith to commercial lending contract); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contract
is Not Dead, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1034, 1037 (1992) ("The Seaman's case has not been widely
followed elsewhere.").
69. See also Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 420, 427 (1995)
(reviewing "confusion and conflict" that arose in interpreting Seaman's); compare, e.g., Martin v. U-Haul Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting a special relationship prerequisite for the bad faith denial of the existence of a contract), with Okun v. Morton, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1988) (requiring a special relationship for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract).
70. Mark Snyderman, What's So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1335, 1363 (1988); see also Sandra
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The golden age of the ever-expanding contract-tort claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith began its decline in Foley
v. Interactive Data Corp.71 There, the California Supreme Court distinguished an employment relationship from an insurance relationship
and found that a contract-tort bad faith claim could not arise in a
typical employment relationship. 72 After Foley, California courts essentially limited contract-tort claims to insurance cases. 73 In 1995, the California Supreme Court even overruled Seaman's itself:
As previously indicated, the Seaman's decision has generated uniform confusion and uncertainty regarding its scope and application, and widespread doubt about the necessity or desirability of its
Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing into the Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
377 (1986); ("[T]he cause of action in tort for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing represents an ill-advised solution to the problems of under compensation and bad faith conduct in the performance and termination of contracts."); Linda
Curtis, DamageMeasurementsfor Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 161 (1985) (outlining economic inefficiency of awarding punitive damages for breach
of contract); Dana Rae Landsdorf, California'sDetortificationof Contract Law: Is the Seaman's
Tort Dead?, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 213, 236 (1992) ("The Seaman's tort should be eliminated
from the commercial contract setting.");Jane L. Rodda, Comment, TheRole of Good Faith in
Lender Liability Suites: Rising Star or Fading Gadfly?, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 953 (1989) (As a
result of Seaman's, "lenders are faced with an undefined new source of liability ... [that]
deters zealous advocacy by the lender's attorney."); John. A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective ofFull Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1565, 1640 (1986) ("[T]he unhappy compromise reached by the
Seaman's court in an attempt to avoid the implications of a broad holding is both troubling
and likely to be mischievous."). But see Michael H. Cohen, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1291 (1985) (arguing that
"breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be recognized as a
tort action in the formation and enforcement of all contracts" and criticizing the "special
relationship" limitation).
71. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). The decline of contract-tort bad faith claims in California appears to have been a side effect of a political debate over the California Supreme
Court's distaste for capital punishment. See Macintosh, supra note 67, at 497-98.
72. 765 P.2d at 396; see also Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (2000)
(reaffirming principles set forth in Foley).
73. See, e.g., Cates Constr,, Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 867 n.14
(1999) ("Subsequent to Foley, the Courts of Appeal have considered this issue in a variety of
settings and have unanimously refused to sanction tort remedies outside the context of an
insurance policy."); Careau & Co. v. Sec. Pac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 402 n.25
(Ct. App. 1990) (reviewing cases where courts "have concluded that certain relationships
are not sufficiently 'special' to warrant imposition of a tort remedy for breach of the implied covenant"). For cases declining to find a special relationship and denying tort relief
in specific situations, see, e.g., Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (Ct. App. 1991)
(bank-depositor relationship); Trustees of the Capital Wholesale Elec. Co. Profit Sharing
and Trust Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 270 Cal. Rptr. 566 (Ct. App. 1990) (investor-stockbroker relationship); Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Superior Court, 260 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Ct.
App. 1989) (bank-commercial borrower relationship); Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 735 (Ct. App. 1989) (non-commercial borrower-bank).
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holding. These doubts and criticisms, express or implied, in decisions from this state and from other state and federal courts,
echoed by the generally adverse scholarly comment cited above,
convince us that Seaman's should be overruled in favor of a general
rule precluding tort recovery for noninsurance contract breach, at
least in the absence of violation of "an independent duty arising
from principles of tort law" other than the bad faith denial of the
existence of, or liability under, the breached contract. As set forth
above, the critics stress, among other factors favoring Seaman's abrogation, the confusion and uncertainty accompanying the decision, the need for stability and predictability in commercial affairs,
the potential for excessive tort damages, and the preference for
legislative rather than judicial action in this area. Even if we were
unimpressed by the nearly unanimous criticism leveled at Seaman's,
on reconsideration the analytical defects in the opinion have become apparent. It seems anomalous to characterize as "tortious"
the bad faith denial of the existence of a contract, while treating as
"contractual" the bad faith denial of liability or responsibility
under an acknowledged contract. In both cases, the breaching
party has acted in bad faith and, accordingly, has presumably committed acts offensive to "accepted notions of business ethics." Yet to
include bad faith denials of liability within Seaman's scope could
potentially convert every contract breach into a tort. Nor would
limiting Seaman's tort to incidents involving "stonewalling" adequately narrow its potential scope. Such conduct by the breaching
party, essentially telling the promisee, "See you in court," could incidentally accompany every breach of contract. For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Seaman's should be overruled. We
emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be read as affecting
the existing precedent governing enforcement of the implied covenant in insurance cases. Further, nothing we say here would prevent the Legislature from creating additional civil remedies for
noninsurance contract breach, including such measures as providing litigation costs and attorney fees in certain aggravated cases, or
assessing increased compensatory damages covering lost profits
and other losses attributable to the breach, as well as restoration of
the Seaman's holding if the Legislature deems that course appropriate. Thus far, however, the Legislature has not manifested an inor to provide tort
tent either to expand contract breach 7 recovery
4
damages for ordinary contract breach.
Other jurisdictions that had followed California's lead in broadening contract-tort claims retreated in California's wake by limiting
claims to insurance relationships. 75 To this day, the majority of states
74. Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1995) (citation
omitted).
75. See, e.g., Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775-76 (Mont. 1990). But see
Worley v. Wyo. Bottling Co., Inc., 1 P.3d 615, 625 (Wyo. 2000) (applying "special relationship" test to determine if employee could bring an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith).
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still recognize a separate contract, tort, or hybrid bad faith cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith arising from
an insurance contract that allows for damages beyond those permitted
in a simple breach of contract action. 76 However, this claim has been
largely confined to dealings between an insured and its insurer, and
generally is not implicated by breaches between parties having any
other "special relationship.

II.

' 77

Development of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
in Pennsylvania

Interestingly, the origins of the implied covenant of good faith in
Pennsylvania date back to times significantly before the articulation of
the modern doctrine in New York and elsewhere. In Singerly v.
Thayer,78 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered a contract in
which the defendant warranted that the installation of a hydraulic
hoist would be "satisfactory in every respect. ' 79 The plaintiff found the
hoist to be unsatisfactory and demanded that it be removed. 80
The court held that the plaintiffs demand was proper. As an initial matter, it held that the satisfaction required in the contract was
the satisfaction of the plaintiff.8 1 However, the discretion accorded
the plaintiff was not without limit:
To justify a refusal to accept the elevator on the ground that it is
not satisfactory, the objection should be made in good faith. It
must not be merely capricious. It is declared in 1 Pars. Cont. 542, if
A. agrees to make something for B., to meet the approval of B., or
with any similar language, B. may reject it for any objection which
is made in good faith, and is not merely capricious. Andrews v. Bel76. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Two-Way Street of Insurance Good Faith: Under Construction, But Not Yet Open, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 95, 107 n.74 (1996) ("[A]t least twenty-nine
states seem to recognize the bad faith breach of a first-party insurance contract as a common law tort."); cf Randy Papetti, The Insurer'sDuty of Good Faith in the Context of Litigation,
60 CEo. WASH. L. Rv. 1931, 1941 n.53 (1992) ("It is nearly impossible to state with certainty whether many states have accepted the first-party bad faith action.").
77. See Macintosh, supra note 67, at 500 ("By the 1990s, the only area in which the bad
faith tort retained any vitality was insurance."). But see Ennes v. H & R Block E. Tax Serv.,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:01CV-447-H, 2002 WL 226345, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2002) (noting
that "in contracts involving 'special relationships' not found in ordinary commercial settings . . . courts find a tort duty of good faith"); Little v. UNUMProvident Corp., 196 F.
Supp. 2d. 659, 670 (S.D. Ohio 2002) ("Ohio courts have defined the tort of bad faith in
broad enough terms to permit its extension to other forms of special relationships beyond
that of insurer and insured.").
78. 2 A. 230 (Pa. 1885).
79. Id. at 232.
80. See id.
81. See id.
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field is cited to support this view. That case arose on a written agreement to build a carriage in a manner which should meet the
approval of the person for whom it was to be made, not only on the
score of workmanship, but also that of convenience and taste.82 It
was held that his rejection made in good faith was conclusive.
Applying this principle, the court found that the hoist's failure to
function properly supported the conclusion that the plaintiffs dissatisfaction was justified, and that the defendant was required to remove
the hoist as requested.8 3 Numerous subsequent Pennsylvania decisions
relied on this language to require that a party's determination as to
84
satisfaction be made in good faith.

Pennsylvania's implied covenant of good faith was expanded significantly beyond a party's satisfaction in two decisions in the middle
of the last century. In Gray v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,8 5 the
plaintiff obtained a judgment against Robert B. MacLatchie based on
injuries the plaintiff had sustained in a car accident. 86 Because the
defendant, MacLatchie's insurer, refused to pay the portion of the
judgment in excess of the policy limits, MacLatchie assigned his claims
to the plaintiff, who proceeded against the defendant in contract for
its breach of the covenant of good faith it owed to MacLatchie. 87 In
determining if MacLatchie could assign his claim against the defendant to the plaintiff, the court reviewed relevant Pennsylvania case
law, as well as Comunale, and touched on the nature of the action
against the defendant:
Our task is to determine whether MacLatchie, the insured, has a
cause of action in assumpsit or in tort against the insurer for its
wrongful refusal to settle.... We believe that this recent case law,
82. Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
83. See id. at 234-35.
84. See, e.g., Adams Radiator & Boiler Works v. Schnader, 26 A. 745 (Pa. 1893); Hood
v. Meininger, 105 A.2d 126, 128 (Pa. 1954); Burke v. Daughters of the Most Holy Redeemer, 26 A.2d 460, 461 (Pa. 1942);Jessup & Moore Paper Co. v. Bryant Paper Co., 129
A. 559, 561 (Pa. 1925); Commonwealth Dept. of Prop. & Supplies v. Berger, 312 A.2d 100
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973); Stuart & Peterson Co. v. Newton, 52 Pa. Super. 158, 160 (Pa.
Super. Ct.1912).
85. 223 A.2d 8 (1966). At least one trial court opinion between Singerly and Gray addresses the implied covenant of good faith in other manners.
Both parties to an ordinary contract agree to do certain things, and while restrictions are not always written into such legal documents, it must be inferred from
the positive covenants that the negative of the same is prohibited, and, in addition to the expressed covenants and obligations, good faith and fair dealing are
always implied and binding upon both parties.
Alumnae Ass'n of the William Penn High School for Girls v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa., 15
Pa. D. & C. 769, 772 (1931)
86. See 223 A.2d at 8-9.
87. See id. at 9.
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employing contractual terms for the obligation of the insurer to
represent in good faith the rights of the insured, indicates that a
breach of such an obligation constitutes a breach of the insurance
contract for which an action in assumpsit will lie.
Similar language has been employed by the Supreme Court of
California:
When there is great risk of a recovery beyond the policy limits so
that the most reasonable manner of disposing of the claim is a settlement which can be made within those limits, a consideration in
good faith of the insured's interest requires the insurer to settle
the claim. Its unwarranted refusal to do so constitutes88[a] breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
88. Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted) (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328
P.2d 198, 201 (Cal. 1958)). On the surface, Perkoski v. Wilson appears to be another case
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the implied covenant of good faith, but
to accept this analysis blindly is unwise. In Perkoski, ajury awarded the plaintiffs an amount
in excess of the defendant's insurance policy. See 92 A.2d 189, 190-91 (Pa. 1952). When
the trial court granted the request of the defendant's insurer to limit recovery under the
defendant's insurance policy to the policy limit, the defendant appealed, contending that
his insurer was responsible for that portion of the judgment in excess of the limit. See id. at
191. In endorsing the defendant's arguments, the court relied on the insurance company's
obligation to act in good faith toward the defendant:
When the company voluntarily undertook the defense of Wilson, in pursuance of
its privilege under the policy, it assumed a position of trust and confidence which
called for an exercise of the utmost good faith, particularly in view of the possible
conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured such as later developed. It
was accordingly incumbent upon the company to inform its policy-holder of its
prospective adverse interest with respect to the extent of its liability under the
terms of the policy. Instead of so doing, however, the company carried on Wilson's defense until final judgments were entered against him. Then, for the first
time, it made known to him that it denied liability for a substantial portion of the
one judgment, not because either or both of the judgments exceeded the specified money limits of the policy but because of the insurer's contention favorable
to itself and detrimental to the interest of its insured. Good conscience and fair
dealing required that the company pursue a course that was not advantageous to
itself while disadvantageous to its policyholder, and, not having so acted, the company was estopped thereafter to the extent of its liability to the insured on account of the judgment against him in favor of the husband-plaintiff.
Id. While there is little doubt that the Perkoski court made use of the insurer's obligation to
act in good faith, it is unclear whether this obligation of good faith arose from the unusual,
fiduciary-like nature of the insurer-insured relationship, from the implied covenant of
good faith as read into the insurance contract, or both. Cf Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., Inc.,
787 A.2d 376, 390 (Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J., concurring) (citing Perkoski as "first recognizing
assumpsit action for bad faith). Indeed, in Malley v. Am. Indem. Corp. the primary case
relied on in Perkoski, the court concentrated primarily on the insurer's superior position vis
Avis the insured, not on the obligations arising out of or implied in the insurance contract.
See 146 A. 571 (Pa. 1929); see also Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 134 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1957)
(discussing both "bad faith on the part of the insurer in the discharge of its contractual
duty" and the fact that an insurance contract "operates ... to create an agency relationship"). As noted, these two varieties of good faith are, in fact, quite different and should
not be confused or substituted for each other. See infra text accompanying notes 149-47.
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed the implied covenant of good faith outside of an insurance context in Daniel B. Van
Campen Corp. v. Building & Construction Trades Council 89 There, the
plaintiff general contractor brought suit against the city of Philadelphia for costs associated with a secondary boycott of its general contractor who used a subcontractor whose employees were not
unionized. The city's failure to intervene to halt or to mitigate the
effects of the boycott led the plaintiff to argue that the city breached
its implied obligations under the contract to cooperate with the
plaintiff.
Although the court found that the contract imposed no such obligation on the city, the court, in interpreting the contract between the
parties, refused to limit itself to the express terms of the parties'
contract.
The law is clear that "[i]n the absence of an express provision, the
law will imply an agreement by the parties to a contract to do and
perform those things that according to reason and justice they
should do in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract
was made and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or
injure the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.
Accordingly, a promise to do an act necessary to carry out the contract must be implied." 90
Daniel B. Van Campen Corp. was followed by Pennsylvania's adoption of the UCC and Restatement provisions on the obligation of
good faith. UCC Section 1-203 was enacted by the Pennsylvania legislature and became effective onJanuary 1, 1980.91 The Pennsylvania Superior Court gave its first unqualified and clear endorsement of
89. 195 A.2d 134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
90. 195 A.2d at 136-37 (citing 8 P.L.E., Contracts, § 140). This principle ultimately
evolved into Pennsylvania's doctrine of necessary implication. See Frickert v. Deiter Bros.
Fuel Co., Inc., 347 A.2d 701, 705 (Pa. 1975) (Pomeroy, J., concurring) (making the first
reference to this principle as the doctrine of necessary implication); Slater v. Pearle Vision
Ctr., Inc., 546 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (setting forth the doctrine of necessary
implication); see alsoW & G Seaford Assocs., L.P. v. E. Shore Mkts., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1336,
1346 (D. Del. 1989) ("Under the doctrine of necessary implication, a promise can be read
into a contract in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made."). Although Pennsylvania's doctrine of necessary implication is related to principles of contractual good faith, it is separate and distinct. See Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost,
777 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2001) (noting that the obligation of good faith "is akin to the contract
doctrine of necessary implication"); Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) ("A similar requirement of good faith has been imposed under a contract doctrine
developed in Pennsylvania case law called the 'doctrine of necessary implication."'). However, the portion of Daniel B. Van Campen Corp. quoted above is cited in a number of other
jurisdictions as embodying the implied covenant of good faith. See, e.g., Boddie-Noell
Prop., Inc. v. 42 Magnolia P'ship, 544 S.E.2d 279, 284 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000).

91.

P.L. 255, No. 1979-86, § 1 (Pa. 1979).
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Restatement Second Section 205 in 1985, while at the same time
harkening back to one of the early modern New York cases on the

covenant of good faith: "Every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair
92
enforcement."

dealing in its performance

and

As Justice Cardozo once wrote: "The law has outgrown its primitive
stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with
' 93
an obligation,' imperfectly expressed.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave its backing to this principle the same year. 94 This adoption was reinforced in Baker v. Lafayette
College,95 where the Pennsylvania Superior Court applied Section 205
to an employment contract, albeit with no substantive discussion as to
what obligations evolved from the covenant of good faith.
Even as Pennsylvania courts made it clear that a covenant of good
faith was implied in all contracts, it was equally apparent that a breach
of this covenant did not give rise to an independent cause of action.
In Engstrom v. John Nuveen & Co., 96 for example, the court examined
an employment contract and found that a breach of the covenant of
good faith was, in essence, a breach of the contract:
There is no claim under Pennsylvania law for breach of a duty of
good faith and fair dealing where the employment relationship is
at-will. There may be an express or implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in any contract between the parties, but if so, its
breach is a breach of contract rather than
an independent breach
97
of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
92. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1985).
93. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (citing Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917) (citation omitted).
94. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 488 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1985). It may
be that the provision currently set forth in Section 205 was adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court as early as 1978. In At. Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 390 A.2d 736 (Pa. 1978),
the court held that a franchisor had an obligation to deal with its franchisee in good faith
and cited both the UCC and a tentative draft of what later became Section 205. See id. at
738 n.7a. Several years later, in Bethlehem Steel Corp., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited
Atl. Richfield as having "accepted as the law of this Commonwealth the principle stated in
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 that '[e]very contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."' 488 A.2d at
600. This leaves room for the argument that the adoption of Section 205 predates the
Section's promulgation, even though later cases point to Germantown Mfg. as the decision
adopting Section 205. See Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co.,
560 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
95. 504 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), affd, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa. 1987).
96. 668 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
97. Id. at 958 (citations omitted).
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Instead, the covenant of good faith was treated as a principle of
contract interpretation whereby courts could gain flexibility in light of
the parties' conduct after the contract in question had been consummated. By logical extension, a claim arising from a breach of the implied covenant of good faith sounds solely in contract, not in tort.98
Thus, two principles of Pennsylvania law on the implied covenant
of good faith are clear from these cases. First, the covenant is implied
in every contract, regardless of the relationship of the parties, and second, this covenant is used to interpret the contract and generally does
not give rise to a separate cause of action, either in tort or contract. As
indicated by the citations provided in each case, these principles are
squarely in line with the approach taken by the UCC, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, numerous commentators, and most jurisdictions across the United States.
III.

Difficulties in Application

After such unequivocal approval for the application of an implied
covenant of good faith to all contracts, it is perhaps puzzling that later
cases would attempt to divide contracts into those that include a covenant of good faith and those that do not implicate such a covenant.
Similarly, it may come as a surprise that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith could sustain a contract-based cause of action independent of a claim for breach of contract, given the covenant is
nothing more than an implied term of the contract. Nevertheless,
courts in Pennsylvania and elsewhere have struggled recently with
these two questions and have often reached conclusions that are at
odds with the dictates of prior case law.
A.

Application to All or a Limited Subset of Contracts?

One of the primary disputes in Pennsylvania courts is over which
types of relationships between contracting parties give rise to an implied covenant of good faith. More specifically, courts have struggled
with the question of whether the covenant is implied in every contract
or only in a limited subset of contracts evidencing a "special relationship." The result has been a body of contradictory case law that effectively leaves the matter unresolved.
98. See Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Ad. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 418, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1996) ("A
claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a species of a contract
claim."); Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co., 560 A.2d 151,
153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) ("Where a duty of good faith arises, it arises under the law of
contracts, not under the law of torts.").
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1. Limited Applications: The Requirement of a Special
Relationship
Much of the confusion surrounding this dispute has its origins in
Creeger Brick & Building Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank and Trust Co.,99
where a borrower brought an action against its bank for tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith. This claim arose from certain
actions undertaken by the bank that had an adverse affect on the borrower's business. The CreegerBrickcourt first noted that both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC state that an obligation
to act in good faith arises in every contract, and that this obligation is
contractual, in nature, not tort-based. 100 However, the court went on
to reject the borrower's claim, making a number of pronouncements
regarding Pennsylvania law in the process:
In this Commonwealth the duty of good faith has been recognized
in limited situations. Most notably, a duty of good faith has been
imposed upon franchisors in their dealings with franchisees. It has
also been imposed upon the relationship between insurer and insured. In Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson, the Superior
Court implied that there may also be a duty of good faith in connection with an employer's attempt to recoup theft losses from the
wife of an employee who was responsible for the thefts.
Conversely, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has refused to impose a duty of good faith which would modify or defeat the legal
rights of a creditor. Other courts have also refused to apply a duty
of good faith to alter or defeat the rights of a creditor which have
been granted by law or contract....
It seems reasonably clear from the decided cases that a lending
institution does not violate a separate duty of good faith by adhering to its agreement with the borrower or by enforcing its legal and
contractual rights as a creditor. The duty of good faith imposed
upon contracting parties does not compel a lender to surrender
rights which it has been given by statute or by the terms of its contract. Similarly, it cannot be said that a lender has violated a duty of
good faith merely because it has negotiated terms of a loan which
are favorable to itself. As such, a lender generally is not liable for
harm caused to a borrower by refusing to advance additional
funds, release collateral, or assist in obtaining additional loans
from third persons. A lending institution also is not required to
delay attempts to recover from a guarantor after the principal
debtor has defaulted. Finally, if the bank in this case falsely represented appellants' financial circumstances to other creditors for
the purpose of damaging appellants' ability to continue doing business, appellants may have causes of action in tort for slander, misrepresentation, or interference with existing or prospective
99.
100.

560 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
See id. at 153.
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contractual relations. There is no need in such cases to create a
separate tort for breach of a duty of good faith.' 0 1
Because so many later cases misconstrue this decision, it is worth
taking a moment to parse the analysis undertaken by the Creeger Brick
court. Creeger Brick cannot be read as holding that the covenant of
good faith is not a part of every contract. While the court noted that
the circumstances recognized as giving rise to an implied covenant of
good faith in Pennsylvania are "limited," the Pennsylvania cases cited
for this limitation address situations where a borrower attempted to
invoke the covenant to prevent a creditor from exercising rights to
which it was entitled under the relevant contract. 10 2 The primary focus of the CreegerBrick decision was not on whether the bank owed the
borrower an obligation of good faith, but rather whether the specific
obligations arising from that obligation trumped the bank's rights and
whether the bank's actions breached those obligations.
Also significant is the Creeger Brick court's distinction between tort
and contract law. At the outset, the court noted that "[w] here a duty
of good faith arises, it arises under the law of contracts, not under the
law of torts." 10 3 In addition, in concluding its analysis, the court reasoned that there was "no need ... to create a separate tort for breach
of a duty of good faith" because of the other remedies available to the
borrower. 10 4 This supports the inference that the court was deciding
not whether the contract between the borrower and the bank gave
rise to an obligation of good faith, but rather whether the borrower
could bring a claim arising from a breach of that obligation in tort.
In the years immediately following Creeger, Pennsylvania courts
upheld the line of thinking espoused in the Restatement and the
101. Id. at 153-55 (citation omitted).
102. See Wagner v. Benson, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Ct. App. 1980); Layne v. Fort Carson
Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Heights v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 342 A.2d
738 (Pa. 1975); Schaller v. Marine Nat'l Bank of Neenah, 388 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. Ct. App.
1986). Indeed, the CreegerBrick court went on to cite a number of cases that gave an expansive interpretation to the implied covenant of good faith: but see K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust
Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (lender had good faith duty to give borrower notice
before refusing to advance further funds under financing agreement where established
maximum credit limit had not been reached); Skeels v. Universal CI. T. Credit Corp., 335 F.2d
846 (3d Cir. 1964) (lender violated duty of good faith by repossessing automobiles despite
repeated acquiescences in late payments and assurances of additional financing); First Nat'
Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226 (Mont. 1984) (lender breached duty of good faith
by accelerating due date of borrower's loan and exercising offset against borrower's checking account). Creeger, 560 A.2d at 154.
103. Id. at 153 (citing AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v. Ad. Richfield Co., 542 A.2d 90, 94
(Pa. 1988)).
104. Id. at 154-55.
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UCC. In Liazis v. Kosta, Inc., 10 5 the court examined a trial court's denial of a petition to open or strike judgment and noted that
"[f1undamentally, every contract imposes upon the parties a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the performance and enforcement of
the contract."' 10 6 Because the creditor allegedly had failed to act in
good faith by providing an accounting for the petitioner, the creditor
had breached its obligations, and the petition raised a meritorious
defense.
The covenant of good faith arose in a slightly different context in
Somers v. Somers.10 7 There, the plaintiff brought suit against his former
employer for breach of an employment contract. Essentially, the
plaintiff was entitled to half of all profits from a specific project the
employer had undertaken. When the employer allegedly failed to negotiate with a third party in good faith regarding the project, the
plaintiff brought suit for breach of the contract, even though the contract did not include a provision governing the employer's conduct in
negotiations with third parties. On appeal, the Superior Court sided
with the plaintiff:
The general duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance
of a contract as found in The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205, has been adopted in this Commonwealth in
CreegerBrick & BuildingSupply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. and
Baker v. Lafayette College. A similar requirement has been imposed
upon contracts within the Uniform Commercial Code by 13 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1203. The duty of "good faith" has been defined as
"[h]onesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."
The obligation to act in good faith in the performance of contractual duties varies somewhat with the context, and a complete catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but it is possible to
recognize certain strains of bad faith which include: evasion of the
spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify
terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other
party's performance.
The duty to perform contractual obligations in good faith does not
evaporate merely because the contract is an employment contract,
and the employee has been held to be an employee at will. 10 8
The court went on to hold that the allegations in the plaintiffs
complaint supported the conclusion that the employer had violated
the covenant of good faith implied in the employment contract.
105. 618 A.2d 450 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
106. Id. at 453 (citing Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 148 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
107. 613 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
108. Id. at 1213 (citation omitted).
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As can be seen from both Liazis and Somers, Pennsylvania courts
acting immediately after CreegerBrick considered the implied covenant
of good faith to be an inseparable part of every contract. The question
for any court was not whether the covenant existed, but what specific
obligations the covenant imposed in a given situation. This position
was in line with Pennsylvania case law stretching back through Baker

and Daniel B. Van Campen Corp. to Singerly.
This thinking was boldly contradicted and called into question by

the Commonwealth Court in Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. E-Z Parks, Inc.10 9 The E-Z Parks court faced a situation where the
Department of Transportation ("DOT") leased E-Z Parks a parking lot
under a lease agreement that gave DOT the right to terminate if any
portion of the premises was required for the transportation construction purposes.' 1 0 After DOT determined that it would use a portion of
the leased premises for a staging area for construction of a highway, it
entered into a lease with a third party for a portion of the premises
and subsequently terminated the lease. E-Z Parks brought suit, arguing in part that DOT's failure to notify it of its negotiations with the
third party constituted a violation of DOT's implied covenant of good
faith. The Board of Claims found in favor of E-Z Parks, whereupon
DOT appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court reversed the Board's
decision:
DOT argues that the Board erred in holding that DOT breached
the termination clause because it had a duty of good faith toward
E-Z Parks. However, Pennsylvania courts have recognized a separate duty of good faith performance of contracts only in limited
circumstances. This duty of good faith is limited to situations where
there is some special relationship between the parties, such as a
confidential or fiduciary relationship. A confidential relationship
exists when "one person has reposed a special confidence in another to the extent that the parties do not deal with each other on
equal terms, either because of an overmastering dominance on
one side, or weakness, dependence or justifiable trust, on the
other." A business association may be the basis of a confidential
relationship "only if one party surrenders substantial control over
some portion of his affairs to the other."
E-Z Parks did not claim nor did the Board of Claims find a confidential relationship between E-Z Parks and DOT. However, the
Board imposed a heightened duty upon DOT because it failed to
apprise E-Z Parks of DOT's negotiations with PPA. Without a finding that a confidential relationship exists, the Board could not im109.
110.

620 A.2d 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 714-15.
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pose a good faith duty upon DOT. Rather, we hold that the parties
had a typical landlord-tenant relationship. There is no special duty
of good faith imposed by the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951.
The termination clause was a negotiated provision, bargained for
between counsel of E-Z Parks and DOT in an arms-length transaction, the terms of which cannot be ignored."1 '
The court went on to state that "actions of government officials
are presumed to have been done in good faith," and that "the challenger has a heavy burden to prove otherwise." ' 1 2 Thus, E-Z Parks was
not entitled to recover based on DOT's alleged breach of its implied
covenant of good faith.
At the onset, it is clear that E-Z Parks shatters the uniform front
established by prior Pennsylvania decisions on the implied covenant
of good faith. In one ruling, the Commonwealth Court contradicted
over 100 years of case law and set the stage for a conflict over which
contracts include a covenant of good faith.
What makes E-Z Parks even more confounding is its lack of supporting citations. First, as discussed below, Creeger Brick does not stand
for the proposition that the implied covenant of good faith is limited
only to certain contracts. Moreover, there is no citation for the statement that the implied covenant of good faith arises only when there is
a "special relationship" between the parties. These defects make E-Z
Parks a flawed decision, at best.
If E-Z Parks were the sole decision restricting the application of
the covenant of good faith, it would, perhaps, be easy to distinguish
and would serve as nothing more than a glitch in an otherwise perfect
lattice of integrated and mutually supporting cases. However, E-Z
Parks was followed by a decision of the Third Circuit in Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,113 which ascribed the same interpretation to Creeger Brick as the E-Z Parks court and precluded the plaintiff
from invoking the implied covenant of good faith. Although the
Third Circuit initially noted the standards set forth in both the Restatement and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Daniel B.
Van Campen Corp., it then isolated Creeger Brick's use of the word
"limited":
Thus, under Pennsylvania law, every contract does not imply a duty
of good faith. In Creeger, the court held that, because other causes
of action existed where the plaintiff could seek relief, "[t] here is no
111. Id. at 717; Act of April 6, 1951, P.L. 69, 68 P.S. §§ 250-101-250-602 (citation
omitted).
112. Id. at 718 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (citing Swartz v. Parking Auth., 439 A.2d 1254
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)).
113. 5 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1993).
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need in such cases to create a separate tort for breach of a duty of
good faith." Similarly, in the case sub judice, Parkway's allegations
concerning the closing of the garage in bad faith are identical to its
allegations under § 1983. Therefore, like the plaintiff in Creeger,
Parkway could seek relief under an established cause of action, and
there is thus no
reason to imply a separate tort for breach of a duty
1 14
of good faith.
The Parkway Garage decision is remarkable for three, reasons.
First, the Third Circuit treated the implied covenant of good faith as
intertwined with a tort claim and did not consider the possibility that
the covenant could give rise to a contract claim or that it could be
used as a rule of contract interpretation. Second, the Parkway Garage
court followed the path set down in E-Z Parks by finding that the implied covenant of good faith was not found in all contracts under
Pennsylvania law. Third, Parkway Garageappeared to impose the additional restriction that a plaintiff has a valid claim arising from a breach
of the covenant of good faith only when the allegations of a breach
differ from the allegations supporting the plaintiffs other claims and
foreclosed the possibility of pleading in the alternative.
These concepts were part of an attempted integration in Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. B.J.M., Jr., Inc.,1 5 where the court gave one of the most
articulate and concise pronunciations of the perceived constraints on
the covenant of good faith:
The courts of Pennsylvania ... have recognized a separate, common-law duty of good faith performance of contracts only in limited situations where there is some special relationship between the
parties, such as a confidential or fiduciary relationship. It should
be noted that where a good faith duty has been found to exist, it
1 16
arises under the law of contracts, not under the law of torts.
When read together, E-Z Parks, Parkway Garage,and Chrysler Credit
reveal several interesting issues. First, through these three cases, the
idea that the implied covenant of good faith is not implicated in every
contract gained a solid foothold in Pennsylvania case law. Courts that
espouse this position adhere to the belief that the covenant to perform a contract in good faith arises only when a "special relationship"
exists between the parties. This thinking is in direct conflict with the
114. Id. at 701-02 (footnote omitted); see also D'Ambrosio v. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins.
Co., 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981) (the court refused to recognize separate cause of action
for breach of good faith where adequate remedy was provided under Unfair Insurance
Practices Act); Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & Teslovich, Inc., 496 A.2d 840,
843 (Pa. 1985) (the court would not create a tort remedy where there was an adequate
remedy to address the claims in existing tort and contract law).
115. 834 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
116. Id. at 841-42.
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earlier Pennsylvania position, which finds a covenant of good faith in
every contract.
More puzzling is the way these courts addressed the nature of a
claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good faith. Each of the
E-Z Parks, Parkway Garage,and Chrysler Credit decisions recognize that a
breach of the covenant of good faith gives rise to a right in contract,
not in tort. However, in Parkway Garage,as in Creeger Brick, the court
concluded by stating that there was "no reason to imply a separate tort
for breach of a covenant of good faith."'1t 7 These seemingly contradictory conclusions hint at a more fluid treatment of the implied covenant of good faith than one might expect.
Instead of marking a readily accepted change in Pennsylvania
law, E-Z Parks, Parkway Garage,and Chysler merely set the stage for a
debate over the implied covenant of good faith. In Kedra v. Nazareth
Hospital,for example, the court held that "Pennsylvania law imposes a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of every contract." ' 18 In doing so, the Kedra court failed to distinguish and completely ignored E-Z Parks, Parkway Garage, and Chrysler Credit. Other
decisions in this period that reached the same conclusion as that
reached in Kedra also did so without so much as a footnote on the
three conflicting cases." 9
Although it failed to reach a decisive conclusion, the federal
court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania attempted to harmonize
these decisions in Fremont v. E.1 Dupont DeNemours & Co., 120 where the
plaintiff alleged that his former employer's failure to provide him with
a bonus violated the employer's obligation to act in good faith in fulfilling its obligations under his employment contract.1 2 1 In resolving a
117. 5 F.3d at 702.
118. 868 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing Liazis v. Kosta, Inc., 618 A.2d 450, 454
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), and Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1985))
119. See, e.g., Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 91 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 1996)
(addressing covenant of good faith in release-dismissal agreement); City of Rome v.
Glanton, 958 F. Supp. 1026, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1997); E.E.O.C. v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 874 F.
Supp. 92, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (addressing covenant of good faith in employment contract);
In re Stroud Ford, Inc., 190 B.R. 785, 787 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995) (addressing covenant of
good faith in asset and real estate purchase context); Kaplan v. Cablevision of Pa., Inc., 671
A.2d 716, 721-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (addressing covenant of good faith in a contract for
cable television services); see also Seal v. Riverside Fed. Sav. Bank, 825 F. Supp. 686, 700
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that the implied covenant of good faith has been "embraced with
increased vigor by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in recent years" and relying on Somers
and the Restatement to find the existence and breach of the covenant).
120. 988 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
121. Id. at 873.

Winter 2003]

IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH

conflict of laws question, the Fremont court noted that Delaware law
holds that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing clearly attaches to
all contracts, 12 2 and then turned to Pennsylvania law:
The precise extent to which Pennsylvania law extends the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, however, is the subject of a degree of
uncertainty. In support of the proposition that the duty applies in
this case, plaintiff argues that the duty inheres in every contract,
citing a diversity case from this district with language to that effect.
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue,
this court's predictive inquiry must be informed by an examination
of the relevant intermediate appellate decisions. It is true that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has on several occasions stated that
23
the duty of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every contract.'
The Superior Court, however, has not been entirely univocal on
this issue. In Creeger Brick & Bldg. Supply Inc. v. Mid-State Bank &
Trust Co., 124 the court, in holding that the duty of good faith could
not defeat express contractual rights, stated that "the duty of good
faith has been recognized in limited situations."
Although the Creegercourt's statement might well be considered, in
the parlance of the statistician, an "outlier," it may not be wholly
disregarded. The Third Circuit, in Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of
Philadelphia,125 read Creeger for the proposition that "under Pennsylvania law, every contract does not imply a duty of good faith"
and held that there is no implied duty of good faith where a plaintiff has recourse to an independent cause of action to vindicate the
same rights126
with respect to which the plaintiff invokes the duty of
good faith.
Thus according to the Third Circuit, whose predictions of state law
this court is bound to1follow,
there are some contracts to which the
27
duty does not attach.
At the same time, Fremont appeared to call into question the legitimacy of the Third Circuit's ultimate determination on this subject:
The Somers court cited Creeger as supporting recognition of a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, but the Creeger opinion may
be read as not in full harmony with the Somers reading. In Seal v.
Riverside Federal Savings Bank,128 this court noted this apparent
anomaly but read Creegerasstanding for the unremarkable proposition that "the implied duty of good faith cannot defeat express
122. Id. at 874 (citing Pierce v. Int'l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361, 1366 (Del. 1996)).
123. See, e.g., Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa. 1992); Liazis v. Kosta, Inc.,
618 A.2d 450, 454 (Pa. 1992), allocaturdenied sub nom. Tantaros v. Liazis, 637 A.2d 290 (Pa.
1993); Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138 (Pa. 1985).
124. 560 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. 1989).
125. 5 F.3d 685, 701 (3d Cir.1993).
126. See also Tycoon Corp. v. Quaker State Corp., Civil Action No. 95-2318, 1995 WL
732814 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Dalzell, J.) (noting tension between Parkway Garage and the general reasoning of Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions).
127. Id. at 874-75 (footnote omitted).
128. 825 F. Supp. 686, 698 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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contractual rights by imposing upon that party specific obligations
that it is entitled, by express agreement, to resist." Accordingly, this
court ruled that the duty inhered in a contract in which a joint
venture partner promised to procure funding for a development
project where plaintiff alleged that the partner instead undermined the project by withholding critical information. In making
this prediction of Pennsylvania law, this court noted that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing "has been embraced with increased
vigor by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in recent years." In light
of this clarification, and the Superior Court's post-Creegeraffirmation, in Somers, of a general duty of good faith, caution should be
exercised before giving broad application to the Creeger court's suggestion that the reach of the duty of good faith is limited. 129
While this discussion in Fremontprovides insight into how the conflicting Pennsylvania decisions might be reconciled, it is little more
than dicta. In examining the specific contract at issue, the court concluded that, regardless of whether one followed those decisions limiting the covenant of good faith to certain contracts or those applying
the covenant broadly, the covenant was implied in the plaintiff's contract with his former employer:
It is ... readily apparent that the agreement at issue in this case is
the type of contract to which, under the pertinent Superior Court
decisions, the duty would attach. Unlike the situation before the
court in Parkway Garage, this is not a case in which the plaintiff has
an independent cause of action that he can invoke to vindicate the
interests he asserts here. Furthermore, the plaintiff in this case is
not, as was the plaintiff in Creeger, seeking to defeat express terms
of a contract by means of the duty of good faith. Thus under both
Delaware and Pennsylvania law, the duty of good faith applies to
this contract, requiring reasonableness in DuPont's exercise of disand determine whether Fremont
cretion to conduct the 1litigation
30
would receive a bonus.

Accordingly, Fremont is educational, but not necessarily of considerable weight.
A less extensive attempt at coordination was made in Northview
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.1 3 1 There, the Third Circuit stated
that "every contract has an implied term that the parties will perform
their duties in good faith," but that "[i]n practice ... the courts have
recognized an independent cause of action for breach of a duty of
132
good faith and fair dealing only in very limited circumstances."'
129. Id. at 874 n.1 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 875 (footnote omitted).
131. 227 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 2000).
132. Id. at 91 (citations omitted). Northview Motors' comment that the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith gives rise to an independent cause of action is discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 167-68.
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However, the court went on to sidestep the question as to whether a
covenant was implied, as it concluded that the plaintiffs good faith
claim was duplicative of its other causes of action and was therefore
33
barred.1
Pennsylvania state courts have largely ignored these attempts at
harmonization and instead typically stake out extreme positions. Re34
cently, in Agrecycle, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh,1
the Commonwealth
Court summarized the more limited approach:
In Pennsylvania, the courts have recognized the duty of good faith
only in limited situations. More specifically, the duty of good faith
may not be implied where (1) a plaintiff has an independent cause
of action to vindicate the same rights with respect to which the
plaintiff invokes the duty of good faith; (2) such implied duty
would result in defeating a party's express contractual rights specifically covered in the written contract by imposing obligations that
the party contracted to avoid; or (3) there
is no confidential or
135
fiduciary relationship between the parties.

Only months earlier, however, the Superior Court applied the
broad approach and held that "[e]very contract in Pennsylvania imposes on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
37
unresolved. 1

36

Thus, this conflict remains

133. See id. at 92.
134. 783 A.2d 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001).
135. Id. at 867 (citations omitted); see also Chester Perfetto Agency, Inc. v. Chubb &
Son, No. Civ. A. 99-3492, 1999 WL 972010, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1999) ("[W]here a
plaintiff has an independent cause of action that he can invoke to vindicate his interests,
no duty of good faith attaches to the contract.").
136. Donahue v. Fed. Express Corp., 753 A.2d 238, 242 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); see also
Romeo v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 787 A.2d 1027, 1033 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) ("Pennsylvania
Courts recognize that all contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith ....
). The
parallel federal cases have also failed to resolve this conflict. Compare Fraser v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Under Pennsylvania Law, a covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract.") with Benevento v. Life USA
Holding, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 407, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("[Uinder Pennsylvania law, every
contract does not imply a duty of good faith. Instead, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is limited to special types of contracts, involving special relationships between the
parties.").
137. Courts in other jurisdictions have struggled with this issue as well, with equally
confounding results. For example, Indiana courts have repeatedly addressed this question,
often with conflicting decisions, and most recently engaged in unusual semantic acrobatics
to find an implied covenant of good faith in the context of an agency relationship:
Indiana law recognizes an implied duty of good faith in all insurance contracts
requiring that an insurer will act in good faith with its insured. This duty results
from the unique nature of the insured/insurer relationship, which may be at varying times arm's-length, fiduciary, and/or adversarial. But Indiana does not imply
such a covenant in every contract. We nevertheless think these agency agreements, though by professionals, are in the category of agreements that carry some
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Unsound Foundations of the Limited Application

To confront this issue properly, it is necessary to look at the rationale for E-Z Parks and its progeny's break with prior Pennsylvania
holdings, which find the covenant of good faith present in all contracts, and its imposition of the "special relationship" requirement.
This break appears to stem from one of three sources: a tort-related
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith, the distinct duty of
good faith found in fiduciary relationships, and the confusion of a
breach with the existence of the implied covenant of good faith. Regardless of the origin, this break is an incorrect interpretation of
Pennsylvania law and, potentially, that of other jurisdictions.
a.

Contract-Tort Claim

The "special relationship" element's most likely source is from
the separate contract-tort claim of bad faith. As seen earlier, bad faith
began in California as a hybrid claim available when insurance companies failed to settle a third-party claim within the limits of the relevant
insurance policy. As part of its now repudiated expansion of contracttort bad faith actions, California briefly permitted such actions where
the parties had a "special relationship" beyond an insurance
relationship.
Pennsylvania's adoption from California law of a "special relationship" requirement for finding that a covenant of good faith exists in a
contract would be incorrect for several reasons. In the first place, in
1981, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entirely rejected the common
law claim for bad faith propounded by California courts."-" In reimplied covenants. Agency relationships generally carry with them the obligation
of the principal to exercise reasonable care to avoid placing the agent in harm's
way in the course of carrying out the agency.
Allen v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157, 1162-63 (Ind. 2002) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Morin Bldg. Prods. Co., Inc. v. Baystone Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415
(7th Cir. 1983) ("The requirement of reasonableness ... is not read into every contract,
because it is not always a reliable guide to the parties' intentions."); Strack & Van Til Supermarkets, Inc. v. First Sec. Underwriting Servs., Inc., No. 2:94-CV-259-RL-2, 1995 WL
831577, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 1995) ("In Indiana, only insurance contracts give rise to
the 'special relationship' required for the imposition of the duty of good faith."); Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Garner, 688 F. Supp. 435, 443 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (refusing to "supply a
general duty of good faith and fair dealing to all contracts in Indiana"); First Fed. Sav.
Bank of Ind. v. Key Mkts., Inc., 559 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. 1990) (finding that an implied covenant of good faith arises only "in limited and particular cases"); cf Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman
ex rel. Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ind. 1993) ("[R]ecognition of a cause of action for the
tortious breach of an insurer's duty to deal with its insured in good faith is appropriate.").
138. See D'Ambrosio v. Penns. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981). The
court based its decision in part on Pennsylvania's then-recently enacted Unfair Insurance
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sponse, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a statute that authorized an insured to bring an action against its insurer for bad faith
in a similar fashion to the bad faith claims permitted in California,
thus avoiding the case law ambiguities that forced California courts to
look for a "special relationship" between the parties. 13 9 It remains unclear if this action sounds in tort, contract, both, or neither, 140 but it is
certain, that it is distinct from a claim based on a breach of the covenant of good faith and that a Pennsylvania bad faith claim has an origin quite different from that of its distant California relative.
Accordingly, it is improper to allow the "special relationship" requirement imposed on bad faith claims in California to bleed into either
Practices Act and found both that "the Unfair Insurance Practices Act serves adequately to
deter bad faith conduct" and that "the count in trespass for alleged bad faith conduct of an
insurer, which seeks both punitive damages and damages for emotional distress, must be
rejected." Id. at 970. DAmbrosio appears to have left intact Pennsylvania case law holding
that an insured may bring a contract-based action against an insurer for breach of the
covenant of good faith. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
139. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2001). In its entirety, Section 8271 reads as follows:
In an action arising under an insurance policy, if the court finds that the insurer
has acted in bad faith toward the insured, the court may take all of the following
actions:
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim from the date the claim was
made by the insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of interest plus
3%.
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer.
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against the insurer.
Id. Pennsylvania courts and commentators agree that this provision was enacted as a response to DAmbrosio. See, e.g., Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 747, 750 (3d
Cir. 1994) ("In D'Ambrosio ... the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there is no
common law remedy under Pennsylvania law for bad faith on the part of insurers. In response, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 which creates a statutory
remedy for bad faith conduct."); Tina M. Oberdorf, Bad Faith Insurance Litigation in Pennsylvania: RecurringIssues Under Section 8371, 33 DUQ. L. REv. 451, 452-53 (1995) ("Because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in D'Ambrosio refused to recognize the bad faith tort cause
of action already adopted by numerous other jurisdictions, the Pennsylvania legislature
created a statutory cause of action for bad faith conduct on the part of insurers on February 7, 1990.").
140. This ongoing debate is most readily seen in the different statutes of limitations
courts have applied to statutory bad faith claims. Cf Linda Suzanne Webb, Limitation of Tort
Actions underAlabama Law: Distinguishingbetween the Two-Year and the Six-Year Statutes of Limitations, 49 ALA. L. REv. 1049, 1072-73 (1998) (discussing problems with catch-all statutes of
limitations for hybrid contract-tort claims). Compare Nelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 988 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying a two-year statute of limitations applicable
to tort actions to statutory bad faith claim) and Susich v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
35 Pa. D. & C.4th 178 (1998) (two-year statute of limitations) with Woody v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 965 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying the six-year "catchall" statute of
limitations to statutory bad faith claim), Mantia v. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 39 Pa. D. & C.4th 71
(1998) (six-year statute of limitations) and Trujillo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 54 Pa.
D. & C. 4th 241 (2001) (six-year statute of limitations).
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Pennsylvania claims arising from a breach of the implied covenant of
good faith or Pennsylvania bad faith claims.
Even if California bad faith law could be viewed as a source for
Pennsylvania claims, imposing a "special relationship" on purely con-

tract-based claims finds no basis in California law. At no point did California ever require a "special relationship" to support the existence of
an implied covenant of good faith. Indeed, California courts have
steadfastly adhered to the principle that every contract includes a covenant of good faith and that a breach of that covenant in any context
inheres in every contract and may give rise to a contract-based
claim. 4 1 The "special relationship" concept was used only in California's brief venture in expanding contract-tort bad faith claims. 14 2
If Pennsylvania courts have confused claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith with contract-tort bad faith claims, it is
understandable why Pennsylvania courts would be reticent to find this
141. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l. Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352 (2000) (stating that "the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing [is] implied by law in every contract").
[T]here is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract
that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement. . . . Because the covenant is a contract
term, in most cases compensation for its breach is limited to contract rather than
tort remedies.
Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151 (2000); see e.g., Cates
Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 864 (1999) ("By now it is well established that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implicit in every contract."); see also
Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension
Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12 (Ariz. 2002) ("When the remedy for breach of the covenant sounds
in contract, it is not necessary for the complaining party to establish a special relationship."); Polk v. Larrabee, 17 P.3d 247 (Idaho 2000) (affirmingjury verdict that employer
had breached duty of good faith implied into implied employment contract); cf Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) ("[W]hile
disparate strength may sometimes be a prominent feature, it is not the sine qua non" of an
action arising from a breach of the duty of good faith.); Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919
P.2d 56, 60-61 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (implying covenant of good faith in employment
contract as a tool of contractual analysis); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce,
868 P.2d 211, 222 (Wyo. 1994) ("When a special relationship of trust and reliance is
demonstrated, a breach of the implied covenant is actionable as a tort."). Even Pennsylvania courts examining California law have recognized this. See Lindenbaum v. Mel
Bernie & Co., Civ. A. No. 87-8000, 1989 WL 38676, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989) (noting
that the California Supreme Court held in Foley that tort remedies are not available for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment cases, but
that Foley "did not abrogate contractual remedies for breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment").
142. See also Vickery, supra note 1, at 96 ("In California, tort liability hinges on a finding
of a special relationship."); cf Cent. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stemmons N.W. Bank, N.A., 848
S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that breach of a covenant of good faith giving rise
to a tort-based claim "can exist at common law where a 'special relationship' exists between
the parties to a contract.").
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covenant in all contracts, given the additional tort remedies awardable
for such a claim and the contraction of bad faith claims in California.143 Indeed, it is remarkable that Pennsylvania courts imposing a
143. Moreover, it is not difficult to see how such confusion could arise. As noted supra,
the terms "duty" and "covenant" are often used interchangeably when referring to good
faith obligations implied in a contract. See supra note 1. However, "duty" is a term that is
frequently associated and interwoven with actions in tort, not in contract. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Hill, 717 So.2d 759, 763 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Jefferson County v. Reach, 368 So.2d 250,
252 (Ala. 1978)),
Where the wrong results from a breach of a promise, the claim is ex contractu.
However, if the wrong springs from a breach of a duty, either growing out of the
relationship of the parties, or imposed by law, the claim is ex delicto. Further,
where the parties have entered into a contract, if the cause of action arises from a
breach of duty arising out of the contract, rather than from a breach of a promise
of the contract itself, the claim is ex delicto.
Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Colo. 2000),
Tort obligations generally arise from duties imposed by law. Tort law is designed
to protect all citizens from the risk of physical harm to their persons or to their
property. These duties are imposed by law without regard to any agreement or
contract. In contrast, contract obligations arise from promises made between
parties.
Ind. Dept. of Transp. v. Shelly & Sands, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 1063, 1077-78 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) ("Even though a constructive fraud claim can relate to a contract, it is grounded in
duty, breach of duty and deceit. Hence, a constructive fraud claim is a tort ..
"); Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Sea-Lar Mgmt., Inc., 787 So. 2d 1069, 1075 (La. Ct.
App. 2001) ("The classic distinction between damages 'ex contractu' and damages 'ex
delicto' is that the former flows from [sic] the breach of a special obligation contractually
assumed by the obligor, whereas the latter flows form the violation of a general duty owed
to all persons."); Phico Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Med. Servs. Corp., 663 A.2d 753, 757 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) ("[T]he important difference between contract and tort actions is that the
latter lie from the breach of duties imposed as a matter of social policy while the former lie
for the breach of duties imposed by mutual consensus."); Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co.,
623 N.W.2d 739, 749 (Wis. 2001) ("Essentially, contract law is based upon the principles of
free will and consent, whereas tort law is based upon the principles of risk-sharing and
social duties."); David W. Robertson, Allocating Authority Among InstitutionalDecision Makers
in Louisiana State Court Negligence and Strict Liability Cases, 57 LA. L. RaV. 1079, 1092-95
(1997) (discussing origins of "duty" requirement for negligence claims). Cf Reynolds v.
Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 766 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Idaho 1988), citing Taylor v. Herbold,
483 P.2d 664, 669 (Idaho 1971), to hold:
[Tjhe duty owed by one party to another in contract could give rise to a cause of
action in tort if the duty to take due care arises independently of the contract, i.e.,
a mere breach of contract will not support a tort cause of action, but a breach of a
separate duty to act reasonably will suffice.
Id. In contrast, "covenant" is a term associated with contract law. See, e.g., Baty v. ProTech
Ins. Agency, 63 S.W.3d 841, 850 n.6 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) ("The words 'covenant' and
'provision' are terms generally associated with contracts and written instruments, not
torts."); Madnick v. Doelling, 713 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ("With regard to
the word 'covenant,' Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, says: 'In its broadest usage,
means any contract."'); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 369 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "covenant"
as "[a] formal agreement or promise, usu[ally] in a contract"). Hence, referring to the
implied covenant of good faith as a "duty" may exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding
good faith and may contribute to confusing bad faith claims with claims arising from a
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"special relationship" requirement rarely find that such a relationship
exists. 144 However, this concern is unwarranted, as a bad faith cause of
action is distinct from an action arising from a breach of the covenant
of good faith. 145 Thus, the application of a bad faith "special relationship" requirement to contractual good faith claims finds no support in
the state where the general principle originated.
As a final reason for disregarding California's "special relationship" requirement, it is worth noting that California courts themselves
have barred bad faith claims other than those brought against insurers. In 1995, the California court specifically curtailed the "special relationship" extension of bad faith claims set forth in Seaman's and
strongly criticized those cases that elaborated on this concept.1 46 For
these three reasons, to the extent that California is the origin of the
"special relationship" requirement found in Pennsylvania law, courts
imposing such a requirement have acted in error.
It is also possible that Texas law could be the source of Pennsylvania's "special relationship" requirement. Under Texas law, the
common law implied covenant of good faith "is not imposed in every
contract but only in special relationships marked by shared trust or an
imbalance in bargaining power."' 4 7 Once a claim for breach of the
covenant of contractual good faith is established, it gives rise to a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith outside of an insurance context. See Ebke &
Griffin, supra note 1, at 1238 (noting that the confusion over whether a breach of good
faith obligations gives rise to a claim in contract or in tort "is aggravated by the tendency of
courts . . . to use the terms 'covenant of good faith' and 'duty of good faith'
interchangeably").
144. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1993); Chrysler
Credit Corp. v. BJ.M.,Jr., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 813 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Agrecycle, Inc. v. City of
Pittsburgh, 783 A.2d 863 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001); Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp. v. E-Z
Parks, Inc., 620 A.2d 712 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). But seeBenevento v. Life USA Holding,
Inc. 61 F. Supp. 2d 407, 424 (1999) (finding implicitly that insurer-insured relationship
qualified as a "special relationship"); Fremont v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 988 F.
Supp. 870, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding it to be "readily apparent" that the relevant employment agreement "is the type of contract to which, under the pertinent Superior Court
decisions, the duty would attach," regardless of the requirement imposed).
145. See Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 787 A.2d 376, 390 (Pa. 2001) (Nigro, J., concurring) ("I believe that the law in this Commonwealth establishes that there are two separate
'bad faith' claims that an insured can bring against an insurer-a contract claim for breach
of the implied contractual duty to act in good faith, and a statutory bad faith tort claim
sounding in tort under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371.").
146. See Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
147. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 495 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990) (citing,
inter alia, Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1988); Arnold v. Nat'l.
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987); Manges v. Guerra, 673 S.W.2d
180, 183 (Tex. 1984)); see also City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. 2000)
("[T]his Court has imposed an actionable duty of good faith and fair dealing only when
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claim sounding in tort, entitling a plaintiff to punitive and mental
48
anguish damages.1
However similar Texas law may be to E-Z Parks and the related
cases, it is nevertheless an unlikely and inappropriate source for Pennsylvania's rule. Only two Pennsylvania decisions have ever cited any
Texas decision when considering claims based on the implied covenant of good faith, and those cases involved an interpretation of Texas
law and jibed with the result that courts in the majority of states would
there is a special relationship, such as that between an insured and his or her insurance
carrier."); In re Marriage of Braddock, 64 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App. 2001) stating:
[T]he duty of good faith and fair dealing exists only if intentionally created by
express language in a contract or unless a special relationship of trust and confidence exists between the parties to the contract. The special relationship necessary to create such a duty of good faith and fair dealing arises either from the
element of trust necessary to accomplish the goals of the contract, or has been
imposed by the courts because of an imbalance of bargaining power.
Id. at 586.
148. See Arnold v. Nat'l. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987); see also
Lias v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 45 S.W.3d 330, 334-35 (Tex. App. 2001) ("[A]
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives rise to a cause of action in tort that is
separate from any cause of action for breach of the underlying insurance contract."); Lyons v. Lindsey Morden Claims Mgmt., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 86, 91 (Tex. App. 1998) ("The duty
of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the special relationship between the parties
to an insurance contract, and therefore its breach gives rise to tort damages and not simply
to contractual liability.");
Texas law does not impose a common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing in
every contract, recognizing the duty only in special relationships marked by
shared trust or imbalance in bargaining power. Once the duty is imposed, however, its breach sounds in tort, allowing recovery of both actual and punitive
damages.
Macintosh, supra note 67, at 500 n.152. Although Texas case law generally supports this
principle, there are a number of decisions that indicate that Texas may face a conflict
similar to that of Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Int'l. Bank, N.A. v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 622, 624
(Tex. 1987) ("The duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner is an
implied covenant in all contracts under Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 9.504 (Vernon
Supp. 1986). Breach of the covenant gives rise to a cause of action sounding in contract for
which punitive damages may not be awarded.");
Every contract or duty governed by the business and commerce code imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. The failure to act in
good faith under Section 1.203, however, does not state an independent tort action. 'A breach of this implied duty under the code gives rise only to a cause of
action for breach of contract.'
Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Stewart, 967 S.W.2d 419, 442 (Tex. App. 1998); Ebke & Griffin,
supra note 1, at 1241 ("The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a lender's
breach of the implied covenant of good faith under the Uniform Commercial Code gives
rise to a cause of action which sounds in contract."); see also Gergen, supra note 8, at 1235
(discussing good faith confusion under Texas law); Dennis Patterson, Good Faith in Tort and
Contract Law: A Comment, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1291, 1292 (1994) (calling Texas law "internally
troubled" and stating that Texas's "refusal to recognize a duty of good faith in contract is
strange, if not perverse").
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have reached.' 4 9 These principles remain uncited by other Pennsylvania decisions, and no other Pennsylvania court demonstrates any
awareness of the distinct approach taken by Texas. In addition, relying
on Texas law would be inconsistent both with earlier Pennsylvania law
extending the covenant of good faith to all contracts and with those
decisions that treat a breach of the implied covenant of good faith as
arising under contract law.'
Thus, to the extent that the "special relationship" requirement has its roots in the tort or tort-like claim for
15 1
bad faith, its presence is unwelcome in Pennsylvania.
b.

Fiduciary or Confidential Relationship

A second potential source for the special relationship requirement is confusion with the duty of good faith that arises in a fiduciary
or confidential relationship with the implied covenant of good
faith.' 52 As in many other jurisdictions, Pennsylvania holds that a fidu149. See In reTexas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., No.
764, 1992 WL 167984 (E.D. Pa.July 10, 1992) (applying Texas law to find a special relationship between insurer and insured); Tersco, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 879 F.
Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding no special relationship between buyer and seller in a
commercial context).
150. See, e.g., Anserphone, Inc. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 955 F. Supp. 418, 431 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
("A claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a species of a contract
claim.").
151. If this is so, Pennsylvania would not be alone. In Carmichael v. Adirondack Bottled
Gas Corp. of Vermont, 635 A.2d 1211 (Vt. 1993), the court addressed an ordinary commercial
contract and stated that an action for breach of the covenant of good faith, which is implied in every contract, "is really no different from a tort action, because the duty of good
faith is imposed by law and is not a contractual term that the parties are free to bargain in
or out as they see fit." Id. at 1216. The court went on to affirm the verdict against the
defendant for breach of the covenant and the concomitant award of punitive damages. See
id. at 1217-18. In this regard, the Vermont Supreme Court appears to have made the same
mistake as the Pennsylvania by confusing the contract-tort claim of bad faith with breach of
the implied covenant of good faith, but with the opposite result: instead of transferring the
special relationship requirement from bad faith and blocking legitimate contract-based
claims, as Pennsylvania courts have done, the Carnichaelcourt took the tort aspects of bad
faith, including punitive damages, and allowed it to bleed into commonplace contractual
claims for breach of the covenant of good faith.
152. See, e.g., Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 376, 391-92 (Pa. 2001) (Zappala,J.,
dissenting) ("[A] breach of the [insurer's] duty to act in good faith arises from a breach of
the fiduciary duty growing out of the liability insurance contract and gives rise to a cause of
action ex delicto."); cf Oldenburger v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 765 P.2d 531, 535 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988) ("We find no fiduciary duties between a home seller and home buyer to justify
a cause of action for bad faith breach of contract."); Farmer's Group, Inc. v. Trimble, 691
P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984) (noting the "quasi-fiduciary nature of the insurance relationship"); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 323 A.2d 495, 507 (N.J. 1974)
("[A]n insurer, having contractually restricted the independent negotiating power of its
insured, has a positive fiduciary duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within the policy coverage."); Bennett v. Farmers Ins. Co., 945 P.2d 595, 604 (Or. Ct.
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ciary or confidential relationship brings with it a duty to act in good
faith.1 53 Although the implied covenant of good faith and the fiduciary duty of good faith have often been confused, commentators have
repeatedly noted that the two are distinct:
In general, a fiduciary who is bound by good faith forgoes the opportunity to act in his own interest at all. An insurer who is bound
by good faith forgoes that opportunity to act solely in its own interest. An ordinary contract party, by contract, is
free to act in its own
15 4
interest so long as it performs as promised.
App. 1997) ("Under either theory of breach of fiduciary duty or the tortious breach of duty
of good faith and fair dealing, plaintiff was required to present evidence that a special
relationship or a fiduciary-type relationship existed between the parties that was independent of the duties under the Agreement."), affd in relevant part, 26 P.3d 785 (Or. 2001);
Macintosh, supra note 67, at 501-15 (discussing the "quasi-fiduciary model" used in early
bad faith decisions); Rice, supra note 6, at 336-37 (discussing certain state's reference to a
"quasi-fiduciary relationship" between an insurer and an insured). Given the
language
used by some California courts, this confusion would be quite reasonable. See, e.g.,
Egan v.
Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979) ("The obligations of good faith and
fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity inherent in the responsibilities
of a fiduciary. Insurers hold themselves out as fiduciaries, and with the public's trust must
go private responsibility consonant with that trust.")
Id. at 146. Moreover, Pennsylvania would hardly be alone in blending these two discrete
types of good faith. See, e.g.,
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985)
(rejecting a tort approach to bad faith because "the contract itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust and reliance placed in the insurer by its insured").
153. See, e.g.,
Strassburger v. Phila. Record Co., 6 A.2d 922, 924 (Pa. 1939) (holding
that a corporate director's fiduciary duty includes the obligation to act in good faith);
McCown v. Fraser, 192 A. 674 (Pa. 1937) (In a confidential relationship, "the party in the
superior position is obligated, legally as well as morally, to act with the most scrupulous
fairness and good faith .. ");Bailey v. Jacobs, 189 A. 320, 324 (Pa. 1937) ("Directors and
officers occupy toward stockholders what is commonly characterized as a fiduciary relationship. They must act in the utmost good faith .. ");Bergner v. Bergner, 67 A. 999, 1001
(Pa. 1909) ("[A]gency is a recognized fiduciary relation; its vital principle is good faith,
without which the relation could not exist.");
A confidential relationship is any relationship existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is bound to act with the utmost good faith for
the benefit of the other party and can take no advantage to himself from his acts
relating to the interest of the other party.
Biddle v. Johnsonbaugh, 664 A.2d 159, 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Frederick v. City of Butler, 374 A.2d 768, 770-71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) ("As a public body, the council of the
City of Butler stands in a fiduciary relationship to the public and to taxpayers, and its
conduct must always be guided by the rule of good faith, fidelity, and integrity.").
154. BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 1, § 9.2.2 n.20; see also Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship
v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing differences between contractual
good faith and fiduciary good faith and the undesired consequences of confusing them);
Int'l Ins. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, No. 88 C 9838, 1991 WL 349907,
at *19 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting "the traditional distinction between the general duty of
good faith owed between contracting parties dealing at arm's length and the more exacting duty of candor owed by fiduciaries"); Burton, supra note 31, at 372 n.17 (noting that
the implied covenant of good faith performance is distinct from the fiduciary duty of good
faith); Allan W. Vestal, FundamentalContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct
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Similarly, a claim arising from a breach of the contract-based implied covenant is distinct from a tort claim arising from a breach of
155
the fiduciary duty.

While it is axiomatic that imposing a fiduciary duty of good faith
requires a fiduciary relationship between the parties, there is no reason to find that other forms of the obligation to act in good faith,
including those arising from a contract, mandate finding a fiduciary
or similar relationship. Yet if fiduciary obligations are the source of
the "special relationship" requirement, this is exactly what Pennsylvania courts have done.
c.

Confusion of Existence of the Covenant with the Breach of
Covenant

As a final option, it is possible that Pennsylvania courts have confused the existence of the implied covenant of good faith with a breach
of the implied covenant. Needless to say, it is important to distinguish
between whether a contract gives rise to a covenant of good faith and
whether a party fulfilled its obligations arising from that covenant. Just
as finding that parties have entered into a contract does not mandate
that the contract was breached, so too would it be peculiar to establish
such a causal connection between the covenant of good faith and a
breach thereof.
While it is not clear that Pennsylvania courts have made this error, it is interesting to note that each of the decisions reached through
the mid-1990s that found an implied covenant of good faith also
found that it was breached.1 5 6 It is not until the end of the 1990s that
courts appear to have grasped this distinction and found a covenant
without an attendant breach. 157 If courts have grasped this distinction,
of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 523, 543 (1993) (noting the position of the ABA Ad Hoc Subcommittee on RUPA members that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a concept of
general contract law and is not to be confused as creating a special relationship duty-a
fiduciary duty"); Allan W. Vestal, Law PartnerExpulsions, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1083,
1086-87 (1998) (differentiating between a partner's fiduciary duty of good faith and a
partner's contractual obligation of good faith).
155. See, e.g., Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456, 463 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) ("Where a contract is involved, in order for a claim in tort to exist, a duty must
exist independently of the duty to perform under the contract, such as a fiduciary
relationship.").
156. See Kedra v. Nazareth Hosp., 868 F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re Stroud Ford,
Inc., 190 B.R. 785 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995); Liazis v. Kosta, Inc., 618 A.2d 450 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992); Somers v. Somers, 613 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
157. See Fremont v. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co., 988 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1997);
Donahue v. Fed. Express Corp., 453 A.2d 238 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
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perhaps they will feel more comfortable implying a covenant of good
faith without fear that a claim will necessarily arise.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the parties to any contract may
take it upon themselves to limit or to restrict the application of the
implied covenant of good faith. 158 As noted by many courts, this covenant cannot be used to override the express terms of a contract.1 59
Thus, contracting parties may draft their agreement in such a way that
a reviewing court is constrained as to the obligations the covenant of
160
good faith may impose.

In short, there are several possible sources from which Pennsylvania courts could have adopted the "special relationship" require158. See VTR, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 303 F. Supp. 773 (C.D.N.Y. 1969)
stating:
As to acts and conduct authorized by the express provisions of the contract, no
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be implied which forbids such acts
and conduct. And if defendants were given the right to do what they did by the
express provisions of the contract there can be no breach.
Id. at 778. Corey R. Chivers, "ContractingAround" the Good Faith Covenant to Avoid Lender
Liability, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 359, 360 (suggesting that many "many have overlooked
...the extent to which contracting parties can 'contract around' the implied good faith
covenant in order to prevent some of the perceived costs that judicial decisions have imposed"); cf Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 434 (Pa. 2001)
(" [W] hen an employer expressly provides in an employment contract for a comprehensive
evaluation and review process, a court may look to the employer's good faith to determine
whether the employer has in fact performed those contractual duties.").
159. See Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 78, 91 (3d Cir.
2000); Square Ltd. P'ship v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 685 A.2d 1019, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (citing Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 388 (Pa. 1986); Reading
Terminal Merchants Ass'n ex rel. Asteris v. Samuel Rappaport Assocs., 456 A.2d 552 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983) (citing Greek v. Wylie, 109 A. 529 (Pa. 1920)); see also Diamond & Foss,
supra note 32, at 587 (The implied covenant of good faith "applies only when the propriety
of the conduct is not resolved by the terms of the contract or by another default rule.").
160. However, it is worth noting that that the implied covenant of good faith frequently may not be disclaimed entirely. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (2002) ("[T]he obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable."); Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889
P.2d 445, 450 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("'[T]he obligation of good faith is 'constructive'
rather than 'implied' because the obligation is imposed by law and cannot be disclaimed."); Burton, supra note 31, at 371 n.14 ("Although the parties are not free to disclaim the obligation to perform in good faith as such ....
they are free to determine by
agreement what good faith will permit or require of them."); Diamond & Foss, supra note
32, at 625 ("Of the courts that have addressed the issue, most, but not all, have agreed that
the covenant cannot be waived."); Van Alstine, supra note 31, at 1226 ("[T] he duty of good
faith is 'imposed' in every contract, and cannot be disclaimed, even by express stipulation."). But see MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. P'ship v. Zadikoff, 995 F. Supp. 929, 932
(N.D. Ill. 1998) ("Under Illinois law, a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
every contract unless expressly disavowed.").

UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

ment for finding that a specific contract includes an implied covenant
of good faith. Nevertheless, imposing such a requirement has no reasonable basis and conflicts with prior Pennsylvania case law. Hence, it
is appropriate for Pennsylvania law to recognize that the covenant of
good faith is, in fact, implied in every contract, irrespective of the type
relationship between the parties.
This conclusion should not lead to an explosion of legitimate
claims arising from breaches of the covenant of good faith. The specific obligations arising from the implied covenant of good faith and
whether those obligations have been fulfilled are extremely fact sensitive inquires and must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Under
some circumstances, these obligations may be so light that they almost
do not exist. However, it would be in error to ignore the covenant
entirely.
B.

Independent Cause of Action or Rule of Contractual
Interpretation?

The second item of confusion in Pennsylvania and elsewhere is
whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith outside of an
insurance context gives rise to a contract-based cause of action separate from an ordinary breach of contract action, or merely serves as a
vehicle for interpreting the contract. As with the issue of which contracts include a covenant of good faith, much of the uncertainty derives from confusing the contract-tort of bad faith with breaches of the
general covenant present in all contracts.
Whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith amounts
to an independent claim or is a rule of contract interpretation has an
effect beyond the mechanics of how the claim is pled. In Pennsylvania,
as in many states, the interpretation of a contract is a question of law
to be resolved by the presiding judge. 16 1 Other questions, including
the intent of the parties and the existence of a breach, are questions
of fact that are often addressed by ajury. 162 Thus, how a breach of the
161. See Highmark, Inc. v. Hosp. Serv. Ass'n of N.E. Pa., 785 A.2d 93, 98 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001); Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Nat'l. Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 768 A.2d 865, 868 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2001).
162. See GMH Assocs., Inc. v. Prudential Realty Group, 752 A.2d 889, 898 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2000); Brinich v. Jencka, 757 A.2d 388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); cf Kirk v. Brentwood
Manor Homes, Inc., 159 A.2d 48 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1960) ("in the case of a disputed oral
contract it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine its terms and the understanding of the parties.").
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implied covenant of good faith is pled will affect how it is treated by
63
courts as a practical matter.'
1. Treatment as an Independent Cause of Action
The majority of Pennsylvania cases through the 1990s to today
respects this approach and have refused to permit independent claims
for breach of the covenant of good faith outside of an insurer-insured
relationship. 164 Thus, in general, "a breach of such covenant is a
breach of contract action, not an independent action for a breach of a
16 5
duty of good faith and fair dealing."'

163. See also Watson Truck & Supply Co., Inc. v. Males, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (N.M. 1990)
("Application of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing becomes difficult, however,
under circumstances where, as here, it may be argued that from the covenant there is to be
implied in fact a term or condition necessary to effect the purpose of a contract."); Rice,
supra note 6, at 335-37 ("[A]mong those tribunals which recognize an independent tort
action for bad faith, significant confusion exists over whether an insurer's duty to act
responsibly is implied in fact or implied in law."). It follows that, if a breach of the implied
covenant is nothing more than a rule of contract interpretation, then it could be a question of law as to what obligations the covenant imposed and a question of fact as to
whether that obligations was fulfilled. Cf Guardian Alarm Co. of Mich. v. May, 24 Fed.
Appx. 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he question of whether a party has adhered to the
duty of good faith is properly decided by the jury .. ");Questar Pipeline Co. v. Grynberg,
201 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming trial court's role in determining what
duties the covenant of good faith imposed because "[t] his was a contractual interpretation
issue and a question of law for the court .. ");Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948
P.2d 412, 421 (Cal. 1998) (discussing jury role in covenant of good faith claims); Rogers v.
Farmers & Merchants Bank, 545 S.E.2d 51, 53 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he question of
good faith is for thejury."); Schawk, Inc. v. Donruss Trading Cards, Inc., 746 N.E.2d 18, 27
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (" [W] hether a party has acted in good faith is generally a question of
fact for the jury.").
164. See, e.g., McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("In
the context of employment contracts, Pennsylvania law does not recognize a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is separate
from a breach of contract action."); Seiple v. Cmty. Hosp. of Lancaster, No. Civ. A. 97-CV8107, 1998 WL 175593, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998) ("Pennsylvania does not recognize a
claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of
action.") (citing McGrenaghan,979 F.Supp. at 328); Drysdale v. Woerth, No. Civ. A. 983090, 1998 WL 966020, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1998) ("While the Commonwealth has
recognized a general duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of a contract,
Pennsylvania does not recognize a claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing as an independent cause of action."); E.E.O.C. v. Pathmark, Inc., No. Civ. A. 973994, 1998 WL 57520, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1998) ("While there may be an express or
implied covenant of good faith in an employment contract, a breach of such covenant is a
breach of contract action, not an independent action for breach of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.").
165. Seiple, 1998 WL 175593, at *2 (citation omitted).
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Yet this is exactly what some courts and numerous practitioners 66
in Pennsylvania have done or appear to have done. For example, in
Killian v. McCulloch,16 7 the court permitted the plaintiff to proceed on
separate claims for breach of contract and breach of the contractual
covenant of good faith:
Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is predicated on Defendants'
failure to pay benefits due under the Plan. Plaintiffs' claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
predicated on Defendants' failure to ensure funding for the required payments under the Plan. While at first glance the two
causes of action may appear to be the same, in reality they are not.
Defendants had a written obligation to pay benefits when they became due, however, the duty to ensure adequate funding for the
Plan arises because Defendants were obligated by contract to pay
the benefits. Although it is not expressly stated in the Plan, such a
duty would be implied by the doctrine of necessary implication because it was the parties' intent for certain employees to receive bo-

nuses after a three and a half year period. Therefore, a difference
exists between obtaining adequate funding to pay out benefits, and
actually paying the benefits when they became due.

In sum, the obligation to ensure funding is not expressly covered
by the terms of the Plan, and this Court finds that such an obligation can be implied under the doctrine of necessary implication
and section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Defend-

ants have provided us with no other reason why Plaintiffs cannot
state a claim for both breach of contract and breach of an implied
covenant. Moreover, to assert that Plaintiffs cannot bring a claim
for breach of the implied covenant because they have already
stated a claim for breach of contract is ludicrous. There is nothing
preventing Plaintiffs from stating two separate claims for breach of
contract in the complaint; likewise, Plaintiffs are not prevented
from stating a claim for breach of contract along with a claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Therefore, plaintiffs have adequately stated a claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 168

166. In McGrenaghan, for example, the plaintiff asserted a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that was inherent in her employment contract, but did not assert a pure breach of contract claim. Likewise, in Seiple, the plaintiff
contended that his former employer had breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing without asserting a breach of the contract itself. In a twist on this theme, the plaintiff in Drysdaleadvanced separate claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 1998 WL 966020, at *1 n.1. See also Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc., 797 A.2d 346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (noting plaintiff's separate claims
for breach of contract and breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
167. 850 F. Supp. 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
168. Id. at 1251 (citation omitted).
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The court spoke more obliquely in Herbst v. GeneralAccident Insurance Co., 169 where it made the following inference:
Pennsylvania law does not recognize a claim for breach of a duty of
good faith and fair dealing arising from the termination of an atwill employment relationship. Only in very limited circumstances
may a distinct claim for breach of a duty of good faith and fair
dealing be maintained
independent of an action for breach of an
170
underlying contract.
While it could be argued in another jurisdiction that this statement was intended to reference bad faith claims, Pennsylvania's refusal to allow bad faith claims outside of an insurance setting removes
this from consideration. 171 Instead, Herbst leaves readers with the impression that Pennsylvania permits a separate contract-based action
for a breach of the covenant of good faith under certain
72
circumstances.
Some decisions take a more nuanced approach that still leaves
open avenues for uncertainty. In Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,' 73 the Third Circuit prohibited an independent action
where a breach of the covenant of good faith was duplicative of a
breach of contract claim, but left room for such an action where it was
based on separate allegations:
Courts have utilized the good faith duty as an interpretive tool to
determine the parties' justifiable expectations in the context of a
breach of contract action, but that duty is not divorced from the
specific clauses of the contract and cannot be used to override an
express contractual term.1 74 Thus, a party is not entitled to main169.

No. Civ. 97-8085, 1999 WL 820194 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1999).

170.

1999 WL 820194, at *3 (citation omitted).

171. Even Herbst's characterization of Creeger Brick as allowing claims in an insurer-insured relationship cannot be taken as an allusion to insurance bad faith claims, as Creeger
Brick was decided while D'Ambrosio's ban on insurance bad faith claims was still in effect and
a year before Section 8371 was adopted.
172. See also AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F. Supp. 1141, 1147-49 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (denying summary judgment as to counterclaim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and allowing defendant to proceed both on this claim
and on breach of contract claim); cf Flight Sys., Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 112 F.3d 124
(3d Cir. 1997) (following prediction that Pennsylvania would recognize a cause of action
for breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith). In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co. the court appears to have been relying on North Carolina law when
it pronounced that a plaintiff's count alleging breach of the contractual duty of good faith
and fair dealing "constitutes a separate cause of action." No. CIV. A. 89-826, 89-1383, 1990
WL 107,28, *9 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 1990) (citing Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1474-76 (D. Wyo. 1987); Payne v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 912 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
173. 227 F.3d 78, 92 (3d Cir. 2000).
174. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 617-18 (3d Cir.
1995); USX Corp. v. Prime Leasing, Inc., 988 F.2d 433, 438 (3d Cir.1993).
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tain an implied duty of good faith claim where the allegations of
bad faith are "identical
to" a claim for "relief under an established
175

cause of action."
• . . [W]e believe that if a plaintiff alleging a violation of the im-

plied covenant of good faith also were to file a claim for fraud
based on the same set of facts, Pennsylvania courts likely would
decline to proceed with the claim alleging bad faith. Instead, Pennsylvania courts would consider the other claims in the plaintiff's
complaint. Such an approach limits the use of the bad faith cause
of action to those instances where it is essential. The covenant of
good faith necessarily is vague and amorphous. Without such judicial limitations in its application, every plaintiff would have an incentive to include bad faith allegations in every contract action. If
construed too broadly, the doctrine could become an all-embracing statement of the parties' obligations under contract law, imposing unintended obligations upon parties and destroying the
mutual benefits created by legally binding agreements. Therefore,
we predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not extend
the limited duty to perform a contract in good faith to a situation
such as that presented here in which the parties in great detail set
forth their mutual obligations and rights in the [Sales and Service
Agreements] .... Overall, we are satisfied that, in the face of these
detailed provisions setting forth both contractually and statutorily
the parties' obligations and rights, we should not recognize an independent cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of
176
good faith in this case.
Further muddying the waters is the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's recent decision in Birth Center v. St. Paul Cos. T7 There, the
175. Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila., 5 F.3d at 701-02 (noting that Parkway's
allegations concerning the closing of a garage in bad faith were identical to its allegations
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, therefore, there was no reason to imply a separate cause of
action for breach of a duty of good faith); see also D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431 A.2d 966, 970 (Pa. 1981) (court refused to recognize separate cause of action for breach of duty of good faith where adequate remedy was provided
under Unfair Insurance Practices Act); Creeger Brick v. Mid-State Bank, 560 A.2d at
154-55; AM/PM Franchise Ass'n v.Atlantic Richfield Co., 373 Pa. Super. 572, 542 A.2d 90,
93-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), aff'd. in part & rev'd on other grounds 526 Pa. 110, 584 A.2d
915 (Pa. 1990); Standard Pipeline Coating Co. v. Solomon & Teslovich, Inc., 344 Pa. Super.
367, 496 A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (court would not create a tort remedy where
there was an adequate remedy to address the claims in existing torts and contracts law).
176. Northview Motors, 227 F.3d at 91-92 (footnote omitted). See also King of Prussia
Equip. Corp. v. Power Curbers, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (barring
independent action where "the inclusion of the proposed claim of breach of a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing adds nothing of consequence to the breach of contract claim");
cf Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing California decisions to state that "a claim for breach of the implied
covenant may be sufficiently alleged where additional conduct by the defendant, separate
and apart from the conduct resulting in the breach, frustrates the plaintiff's right to benefits due under the contract").
177. 787 A.2d 376 (Pa. 2001).
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court held that an insurer was liable for compensatory damages resulting from its breach of the implied covenant of good faith and bad
faith conduct. In doing so, the court implied that a bad faith claim
under 42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes section 8371 automatically gave rise to a contract cause of action for breach of the covenant
of good faith, but did not distinguish between a breach of contract
action and a potential independent claim for breach of the implied
1 78
covenant of good faith.
Of even greater significance is the crossfire between the concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice Steven Zappala dissented essentially based on his belief that "a claim for bad faith refusal to settle
sounds in tort, not in contract." 17 9 In doing so, Justice Zappala drew a
line between breach of an insurance contract and breach of the covenant of good faith arising from that contract:
It is hornbook law that a breach of either the duty to indemnify or
the duty to defend constitutes a breach of a promise set forth in
the liability insurance contract and gives rise to a cause of action ex
contractu; a breach of the duty to act in good faith arises from a
breach of the fiduciary duty growing out of the liability
insurance
80
contract and gives rise to a cause of action ex delicto.1
The logical inference to be drawn from this statement is that a
breach of the covenant of good faith cannot give rise to a contract
action at all. If a contract-based claim does not accrue as a result of a
breach of the covenant in an insurance context, there is little chance
that such a claim can be found under other circumstances.
In his concurrence, Justice Russell Nigro confronted Justice Zappala's arguments and articulated a distinction between tort-based bad
faith claims and contract-based bad faith claims:
I... write separately to assert my view that, unlike Justice Zappalla
[sic], I believe that the law in this Commonwealth establishes that
there are two separate "bad faith" claims that an insured can bring
against an insurer-a contract claim for breach of the implied con178. See id. at 389. Cf Daugherty v. Allstate Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 224 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)
("While the contractual duty and the duty to act in good faith are separate and distinct
duties, they are related, and both must exist simultaneously to create a bad faith claim.");
N.A. Van Lines, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 678 So. 2d 1325, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
("[B]ad faith is a sub-category of a breach of contract case."); Metro. Prop. & Cas. v.
Harper, 7 P.3d 541, 548 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a violation of the generalized
standard of care for performance may give rise to a claim for breach of contract wherein
an aggrieved party is not limited to a tort remedy). But see Republic Ins. Co. v. Stoker, 903
S.W.2d 338, 344 (Tex. 1995) (noting that "[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have ... held that
recovery for bad faith does not depend on a breach of the insurance contract").
179. 787 A.2d at 391.
180. Id. at 391-92 (citation omitted).
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tractual duty to act in good faith, and a statutory bad faith tort
claim sounding in tort under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. Pursuant to the
contract claim, an insured may recover traditional contract damages, including compensatories. Pursuant to the statutory claim,
however, the insured may recover only those damages specifically
set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, i.e., punitive damages, attorney fees,
court costs and interest.
Although historically the case law in this Commonwealth has been
less than clear as to the nature of the common law "bad faith"
claim against an insurer, i.e., whether it sounds in tort or contract,
I believe that any ambiguity in that regard was settled by
D'Ambrosio,which explicitly stated that there is no common law bad
faith tort claim. D'Ambrosio, however, did not address the viability of
the bad faith contract claim, which has its roots in the 1952 case of
Perkoski v. Wilson,' 81 and was reaffirmed by this Court in Gray. Accordingly, D'Ambrosio left the long-recognized contractual bad faith
claim undisturbed.
By subsequently enacting 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, the General Assembly
filled the gap that we had identified in DAmbrosio with a statutory
cause of action in tort for bad faith. By virtue of § 8371, insureds
may now supplement the breach of contract damages that they can
obtain through their bad faith contract action by also bringing a
claim under
§ 8371 for the specific damages authorized in that
82
statute.'
Thus, Justice Nigro's opinion can be read as endorsing the idea
that a contract "bad faith" claim is possible and that this claim is independent of a breach of contract claim.
Although these opinions focus primarily on insurance bad faith
claims, they are nonetheless instructive. Thus, Birth Center in its entirety presents three approaches. The first is the Birth Center majority
approach, where an insurance bad faith claim encapsulates a breach
of contract claim. The second, articulated by Justice Zappala, holds
that breach of the covenant of good faith in an insurance context is a
tort, a breach of a contract's term gives rise to a contract action, and,
presumably, breach of the covenant of good faith in any other context
181. 92 A.2d 189 (Pa. 1952) (first recognizing assumpsit action for bad faith).
182. Id. at 390-91 (footnote omitted); see also Guthrie Clinic, Ltd. v. Travelers Indem.
Co. of Ill. No. 3:00 CV 1173, 2000 WL 1853044, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2000) (citing Birth
Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., Inc., 727 A.2d 1144, 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999), to state that "it is
proper for the plaintiff to plead causes of action for breach of fiduciary duties and breach
common law duty of good faith that are separate from the breach of contract claim"); cf
Marathon Ashland Pipe Line LLC v. Md. Cas. Co., 243 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001)
("[A] bad faith claim requires an entirely separate analysis from a contractual claim. Bad
faith claims are a species of tort law, not of contract law."); Lias v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 45 S.W.3d 330, 334-35 (Tex. App. 2001) ("While a policy claim and a bad faith
claim both involve policy coverage, a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives
rise to a cause of action in tort that is separate from any cause of action for breach of the
underlying insurance contract.").
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is of no import. Third is Justice Nigro's implied belief that a breach of
the covenant of good faith may be brought as a tort claim in an insurance context and as a contract claim, potentially independently, in
other contexts. This conflict is especially confusing when viewed in
light of earlier decisions that open the question as to whether a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith should be prosecuted
separately from a breach of contract action or should be presented as
one facet of a breach of contract claim.
2.

Good Faith as a Rule of Contract Interpretation

Again, much of the confusion stems from a failure to distinguish
between tort-contract bad faith claims accruing against insurers under
42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes section 8371 and claims arising
from a breach of the implied covenant of good faith in other settings.
It is essential that each of these claims be examined separately.
A synthesis of the opinions of Justices Nigro and Zappala in Birth
Center reveals that insurance bad faith claims brought under Pennsylvania statute are entitled to treatment as actions independent of a
breach of contract claim. The punitive damages permitted under the
bad faith statute make it impossible to consider a claim brought thereunder as nothing more than one part of a breach of contract claim, as
18
punitive damages are not permitted in a breach of contract action. 3
This conclusion has the support of other jurisdictions where similar actions are treated as independent causes of action. 184 Of particu183. Cf Johnson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 698 A.2d 631, 639 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("The
law of Pennsylvania clearly provides . . .that punitive damages are not recoverable in an
action solely based upon breach of contract.").
184. See, e.g., Blue Diamond, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 2d 631 (S.D. Miss.
1998) stating:
[P]arties to an insurance contract are expected to deal with each other in good
faith and must abstain from any conduct which impairs the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement. A breach of this duty may give rise to an
independent tort action for bad faith.
Id. at 633. Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 346 (Haw. 1996) ("[T]here is
a legal duty, implied in a first-and third-party insurance contract, that the insurer must act
in good faith in dealing with its insured, and a breach of that duty of good faith gives rise
to an independent tort cause of action.");
[A]n insured who believes an insurance claim has been wrongly denied may have
available two distinct legal theories, one for breach of the insurance contract and
one in tort for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing; the two theories
have separate, though often overlapping, elements, defenses and recoveries.
County Line Towing, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 714 N.E.2d 285, 291 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999);
Tynes v. Bankers Life Co., 730 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Mont. 1986) ("A cause of action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a separate tort action, independent of the underlying contract."); Lias v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 45 S.W.3d 330,
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lar interest is how Missouri courts have addressed this issue, as
Missouri, like Pennsylvania, permits bad faith claims by statute, not
case law'

85

:

Bad faith liability is a separate cause of action from failure to defend. If an insurer is obligated to provide a defense, but fails to do
so, the insured has a cause of action for breach of contract. Where
the insurer has an opportunity to settle a claim against its insured
within the policy limits, but fails to do 1so,
the insured may have an
86
action for "bad faith" refusal to settle.
Thus, Pennsylvania statutory bad faith claims may be treated as
independent of other breaches of the implied covenant of good faith.

The law becomes more opaque when considering the treatment
of breaches of the implied covenant of good faith in a non-insurance
context. While a number of recent cases have, to some extent, recognized a separate contract-based obligation or hinted that they would
do so, Pennsylvania case law militates against adopting this position.
Earlier decisions speak to "implying an agreement" that would fill in
the gaps of existing contract provisions, 18 7 while Engstrom v. John
Nuveen & Co.' 8 8 makes it clear that there is no separate action of any
kind for breach of the covenant of good faith in an employment context.18 9 As has already been noted, an employment relationship was
among the first affiliations outside of an insurance relationship that
could give rise to an independent claim in tort. 90 If a breach of the
covenant of good faith in an employment contract does not give rise
to a separate cause of action, it is logical to conclude that breaches in
other types of contracts are similarly limited. Recent cases that reach
334-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) ("[A] breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing gives
rise to a cause of action in tort that is separate from any cause of action for breach of the
underlying insurance contract."); cf A.A.A. Pool Serv. & Supply, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 395 A.2d 724, 725-26 (R.I. 1978) ("[P]arties to a contract have an implied obligation
to deal fairly with one another. However, we do not agree with plaintiff's assertion that the
unfair denial of its claim entitles it to sue its insurer in tort.").
185. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.420 (West 2001).
186. AnthonyJ. Fussner, Comment, Overview of Bad Faith Litigation in Missouri, 62 Mo.
L. REv. 807 (1997) (citing, inter alia, Butters v. City of Independence, 513 S.W.2d 418 (Mo.
1974), Bonner v. Auto. Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 899 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995),
Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Landie v.
Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)); see also Lynnette L. Cox,
Note, Overcast v. Billings Mutual Insurance Co.: Defamation or Vexatious Refusal to Pay, 69
UMKC L. REV. 927 (1997) (discussing tort possibilities for bad faith and similar claims in
Missouri).
187. See Daniel B. Van Campen Corp v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council of Phila. and
Vicinity, 195 A.2d 134, 136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1963).
188. 668 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
189. See id. at 958.
190. See supra note 62.
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this end and use the covenant of good faith as a tool of contractual
interpretation are better reasoned than their counterpart decisions
that hold otherwise. 19 1
Moreover, the basis for courts finding a separate contract claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith is faulty. Most of these courts
appear to have examined Engstrom and Creeger Brick's rejection of a
separate tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith in most
circumstances and construed this rejection as an opening for separate
contract claims in certain contexts, including situations where the allegations giving rise to the separate claim are distinct from those giving
rise to another action.1 9 2 This failure to discriminate between bad
faith claims and contract-based claims is, once again, the source of
flawed decisions.
Outside of Pennsylvania, courts considering this issue have almost
uniformly held that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
under such circumstances amounts to nothing more than a breach of
contract claim. 19 3 This supports the conclusion that Pennsylvania
courts have historically been correct in their interpretations of the law
Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 617 (3d
191. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1995) ("[Clourts generally utilize the good faith duty as an interpretive tool to determine 'the parties' justifiable expectations,' and do not enforce an independent duty divorced from the specific clauses of the contract."); ATI Ctrs., Inc. v. ATI Res., Inc., No. 99CV-734, 1999 WL 562243, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1999); Jordan v. SmithKline Beecham,
Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1012, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("A claim for breach of good faith and fair
dealing should be treated as a breach of contract claim.").
192. Cf ATI Ctrs., Inc., 1999 WL 562243, at *3 (addressing a commercial contract and
concluding that "Pennsylvania does not recognize a cause of action in tort for breach of a
duty of good faith separate and apart from a breach of contract claim").
193. See Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc. v.JGR, Inc., 3 Fed. Appx. 467, 471 (6th Cir.
2001) ("[T]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.., is not an independent
basis for a cause of action."); Echo, Inc. v. Whitson Co., 121 F.3d 1099, 1106 (7th Cir. 1997)
("The obligation of good faith, therefore, creates neither a cause of action sounding in tort
nor its own sui generiscause of action."); Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. O.R. Concepts, Inc. 69
F.3d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not an
independent source of duties for the parties to a contract. Instead, the covenant merely
'guides the construction of the explicit terms in the agreement."'); Medtronic, Inc. v. ConvaCare, Inc., 17 F.3d 252, 256 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Minnesota law does not recognize a cause
of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing separate from
the underlying breach of contract claim."); Swedish Civil Aviation Admin. v. Project Mgmt.
Enters., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (D. Md. 2002) ("The implied duty of good faith ...
is merely part of an action for breach of contract."); Designers N. Carpet, Inc. v. Mohawk
Indus., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) ("A claim for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not provide a cause of action that is separate
and different from a breach of contract claim. Rather, breach of that duty is merely a
breach of the underlying contract.");
[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not an independent contract
term. It is a doctrine which modifies all explicit terms of the contract. For this
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and that any recent aberrations may be overlooked. This approach
was neatly summarized in a recent federal court decision:
This court finds that Pennsylvania law would not recognize a claim
for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent cause of action separate from the breach of contract claim
since the actions forming the basis of the breach of contract claim
are essentially the same as the actions forming the basis of the bad
faith claim. Plaintiffs cite Somers v. Somers,194 in support of the
claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, the majority in Somers only stated that the general
duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of a contract has been adopted in this Commonwealth, and that a party
may bring a claim for breach of contract. A breach of such covereason, a cause of action for breach of the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing
will not stand without breach of an explicit contract provision.
Gibbs Props. Corp. v. CIGNA Corp., 196 F.R.D. 430, 441 (M.D. Fla. 2000); Clark Bros. Sales
Co. v. Dana Corp., 77 F. Stipp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 1999) ("Under Michigan law, this
implied covenant does not override the express terms of the parties' contract, and cannot
form the basis for a claim independent of that contract."); Fleet Nat. Bank v. Liuzzo, 766 F.
Supp. 61, 67 (D.R.I. 1991) ("[A] breach of the duty of good faith gives rise only to a breach
of contract claim, not to an independent cause of action in tort."); Stuart Enters. Int'l, Inc.
v. Peykan, Inc., 555 S.E.2d 881, 884 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency, 675
N.E.2d 897, 903 (II1. 1996) ("The implied covenant of good faith modifies, and becomes
part of, the provisions of the contract itself. As such, the covenant is not independent of
the contract."); Hauer v. Union State Bank of Wautoma, 532 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1995) (Section 1-203 of the UCC "does not support an independent cause of action
for failure to act in good faith under a contract."); cf McKie v. Huntley, 620 N.W.2d 599,
602 (S.D. 2000) ("[S]ettled law precludes an independent tort action for breach of good
faith and fair dealing arising from a contract." (quoting High Plains Genetics Research,
Inc. v. J K Mill-iron Ranch, 535 N.W.2d 839, 843 (S.D. 1995)); Charles E. Brauer Co., Inc. v.
NationsBank of Va., N.A., 466 S.E.2d 382, 385 (Va. 1996) ("The breach of the implied duty
under the U.C.C. gives rise only to a cause of action for breach of contract."); UCC § 1-203
cmt. (2002) ("[T]he doctrine of good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting
contracts within the commercial context in which they are created, performed, and enforced, and does not create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which can be
independently breached."). It appears that California may be an exception to this rule. See
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (interpreting California law to hold that a claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith "must be dismissed as duplicative where it merely restates the contract claim,"
but that it "may be sufficiently alleged where additional conduct by the defendant, separate
and apart from the conduct resulting in the breach, frustrates the plaintiff's right to benefits due under the contract"); cf White v. Ransmeier & Spellman, 950 F. Supp. 39, 42
(D.N.H. 1996) (holding that employee's conduct was divorced from her contractual obligations to such an extent that it could not give rise to a breach of the covenant of good
faith implied in the contract); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d
841, 864 (Idaho 1991) ("A violation of the implied covenant is a breach of the contract. It
does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims, nor does it
result in separate contract damages unless such damages specifically relate to the breach of
the good faith covenant.").
194. 613 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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nant is a breach of contract action, not an independent
action for
9 5
breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.'
Conclusion
As demonstrated, the implied covenant of good faith is an essential tool of modern contractual interpretation. From the New York of
one hundred years ago to middle twentieth century California to present-day Pennsylvania, courts and scholars have sculpted this flexible
technique to maintain a delicate balance between tort and contract
law and to ensure that terms omitted from any contract's express provisions yet indispensable to performance as envisioned by the contract
are taken into account.
While the implied covenant of good faith is fundamental to and
inherent in every contract, it is important to recognize the covenant's
limitations. With the exception of insurance contexts, the covenant
cannot be given status independent of the underlying contract and
cannot serve as the basis for its own separate claim. Courts elevating
the covenant of good faith in this manner do so in error and in contravention of the history of the covenant and the prevailing sentiment
in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions.
In addition to establishing these principles, this article has provided two examples of how a failure to stay aware of the subtle distinctions that exist in principles of contractual good faith can wreak havoc
with the law and lead to decisions that are both contradictory and
confusing. Even a small misstep, such as overlooking the differences
in how good faith is treated in an insurance contract, an employment
contract, and a commercial contract, can lead to disastrous results
that later courts may build upon to create an erroneous body of law.
Given that the doctrine's breadth and frequent use require
heightened attention, it is necessary that courts, commentators, and
practitioners, whether in Pennsylvania or elsewhere, keep these distinctions in mind when engaging in discussions on good faith. Any
actions that fail to live up to this standard have the potential to return
to perplex us in the future.

195. McHale v. NuEnergy Group, No. Civ. A. 01-4111, 2002 WL 321797, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 27, 2002) (citation omitted); see also Dentrust Dental P.C. v. Correctional Physicians
Servs. Inc., 37 Pa. D. & C.4th 305, 311 (Pa. Com. P1. 1997) ("While Pennsylvania may not
recognize an independent cause of action for breach of a duty to negotiate in good faith, it
does recognize the fact that every contract carries with it an obligation to act in good faith
pursuant to the obligations undertaken in that contract.").
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